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There are a numoer or aporoacnes to the measurement or community power, une is the 
reputationai method, which rocuses upon its perception. It was onqinally developed during 
the IVSO'S Dv Flovd Hunter as an instrument that measures the reputation tor global 
levels or power. This approach nas been criticized tor railing to address such perceptions 
as they appiv to speciric situations. In particular, it does not measure the power or actors 
and groups rrom dirierent arenas and their abilities to inriuence policies ana decisions 
oasea in those issues arrectinq the community. The author proposes a reputationai model 
that rocuses upon the perception or various aspects or community power. During the 
preliminary pnase or this approach, social issues important to the people in the community 
are laennried, as well as those arenas in wmch relative policies and decisions are made. 
The moaei also includes two complementary measures or community power as it is 
exercised by individuals and organizations within a global context. The tirst rocuses upon 
the perception or power over policies and decisions originating with a number or different 
arenas and arrecting the resolution or speciric issues: the second measure, however, is 
not as clearly denned ana disregards the importance or issues ana arenas in depicting 
local distributions. In addition, the model includes a variety or indices designed to isolate 
certain aspects or power and rocus upon its relationship to issues addressed within 
speciric arenas. These indices are operationaiized through questionnaires that serve to 
avoid the inherent assumption or a monolithic power structure characteristic or Hunter's 
traditional approach. The need ror application ana rurther testing is discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
During much or the twentieth century, power, leadership and related 
phenomena have been important areas or inquiry by social scientists. In recent 
years, this interest has subsided and shifted towards other matters. The study 
or community power is grounded in two major theories that address different 
aspects ot its nature, as well as the pattern of distribution and competition 
among social actors. Each is associated with unique approaches to the 
measurement of power and leadership at the local level. The first is the elite 
perspective iCollins, 1971, 1975, 1979; Dahrendorf, 1970; Hunter, 1953; Karim, 
1987; Lenski, 1966; Ossowski, 1956, 1963; Santasombat, 1985), the view that 
community power is monopolized by local power elite who influence the 
formulation or virtually every important policy ana decision. A majority or its 
advocates employ reputational measures in which community leaders are 
identified by intormants.* Most or them tend to rocus only upon global levels of 
power, failing to address its perception in regard to specific contexts and 
situations/ 
^he terms inrormants and judges refer to individuals presumed to be familiar with the 
pattern of decision making and the distribution of community power (Hunter, 1953/. 
^Although there are some exceptions. One (research) design that does in fact measure the 
reputation for community power within both global and specific contexts has been 
developed bv Agger il956). 
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Anotner theory is pluralism <Dahl. 1961, Polsbv, 1963. 1960; Woltinger, 1960, 
1974;. wmcn canrenas rhat community power is distributed among various social 
actors and qroucs who influence policies ana decisions made in regard to isolated 
issues. Pluralists usually employ the decisional approach (also reterred to as the 
issue or event analysis method; to locate them. Although most community power 
studies consist or either reputationai or decisional measures, some have 
undertaken a comparative approach that assesses tne relative validity ot both.'3 
The reputationai and aecisionai models are characterized bv different 
advantages ana disadvantages. As previously suggested, the traditional 
reputationai method is designea to measure only the perception ot global levels 
ot community power, not within the context of specific issues. That is, it tends 
to rocus upon perceived power distributions over a broad range of issues while 
disregaraing its application to specific settings. This does not present a very 
realistic picture ot local leadership and power as it is exercised in the 
community. In actuality, some actors may be more influential over some issues 
than others. One disadvantage ot the decisional approach is its failure to 
recognize the community power ot covert actors. It tends to equate power with 
tormai leadership, a visible structure that has the legitimate authority and 
responsibility tor making decisions arfecting the community. Yet, local residents 
not belonging to this circle may. nonetheless, have a significant amount or 
impact, a ractor not acknowiedgea by advocates or this method. 
JThere are various studies or community power that include both reputationai and 
decisional designs, out these are generally conducted by researchers who analyze ana 
compare data rrom a number or case studies iBonjean & Grimes, 1974). An example of a 
comparative approach consisting of reputationai and decisional measures (as well as the 
verstehen method; is one conducted by Presthus U964). 
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The purpose of this thesis is to refine the reputational approach and make it 
more applicable to research in community power. The first part critiques and 
summarizes competing theories and methods or measurement. From this 
toundation, the remaining portion presents a revised model that accounts for the 
reputation of community power within both global and specific contexts. Use or 
this model will provide a more accurate depiction of power as perceived by 
knowledgeable informants, as well as the general public. Through this approach, 
it will be possible to portray an actor's ability to influence decisions concerned 
with various issues affecting the community and made within specific arenas. 
Rationale 
Because alternative approaches to the study of community power are grounded 
in different perspectives, it is very likely that conceptual biases will result in 
the disclosure of only certain types of configurations. Researchers employing 
the reputational and decisional methods tend to uncover monolithic and pluralistic 
structures, respectively. Discrepancies may be attributed to two factors: (a) 
alternative definitions or community power, and (b) emphases upon different 
aspects of this concept. The decisional method target those actors who exercise 
power by generating decisions that affect the outcomes of specific issues. The 
reputational approach, on the other hand, does not include an objective measure, 
but rather tocuses upon prestige and the reputation tor community power <among 
inrormants;. A high degree of visibility may not be indicative of one s actual 
power. Individuals entrusted with implementing decisions and policy often act in 
the interest of another party. In light of these differences, an analysis of 
various theoretical perspectives is an essential prerequisite to methodological 
development. 
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Each method also has certain assumptions. The reputational method assumes 
that social actors identified by knowledgeables are likely to exercise community 
power, and that they are local elite collectively constituting a monolithic 
structure. The decisional approach, on the other hand, assumes that such power 
is shared by a number of actors who exercise it by formulating policies and 
decisions oased on isolated issues. 
Among sociologists, the predominant perspective of community power is 
elitism, thus the predominant method of measurment is the reputational. They 
argue that power is difficult to measure through objective means, a justification 
for tocusing upon its perception by a variety of informants, the format or the 
reputational approach. Although decision making is a manifestation of community 
power, the generation of formal decisions may be influenced by a wide range of 
actors, including those who are covert and tend to be difficult to locate. 
Community decision makers may not—publicly—acknowledge the role of local 
power elite in the decision making process, thus inhibiting access to these 
intluentials. 
In the reputational approach samples of informants tend to be relatively 
large, a factor that fosters a decrease in the probability of error associated with 
the incorrect identification of community leaders. Despite their validity, most 
reputational designs measure only general levels of power, even though many 
leaders are limited to making decisions based on a certain number of issues. For 
this reason, the revised model presented in this thesis is a modification of the 
reputational method, focusing upon social status and the reputation for 
community power within specific arenas of responsibility.4 
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Definition or Terms 
Prior to addressing the issue or community power, it is necessary to define 
the concept, as well as other terms that are used throughout this thesis. First, 
sociological dennitions of different types of social units are presented. Next, 
the author presents a definition of community power proposed by Hunter (1953). 
Socioiogical perspectives tend to emphasize the functional nature of 
communities iMadver, 1931, 1937; Sanders, 1966; Warren, 1963). According to 
Warren il963), the community is the functional component of society. It is 
considered to be a social system that intercedes between the individual and 
society ^Sanders, 1966). In society, regular patterns of social interaction occur 
most rrequently at the local level. On this basis, communities are regarded as 
microcosms of society at large. A society's form of government tends to be 
relatively similar to that of its constituent communities;^ thus local level 
arenas offer more formal means of delineating the structure of power. Studies of 
^This variation of the reputational approach is—in part—attributed to Bonjean and Olson 
(1964) and D'Antonio and Erickson (1962), who focus upon the influence or community 
leaders and the perception of their power within a number of issue areas rather than over 
isolated issues. In their method, the power to influence policy and decision making 
associated with several issues is an index of a global level of community power, thus 
speciric policies and decisions related to each are not seen as being very important. A 
leader inrluential within a variety of areas tends to possess power in the general sense. 
In terms or reputation, those perceived as influential within various areas are thus 
perceived as powerrul and said to have reputations for community power. 
^ While this may generally be true, such is not always the case. In some societies different 
types of power structures are instituted at different levels of government. Some 
communities are characterized by patterns or"configurations" of power that are remarkably 
distinct rrom their parent societies. Thus it may be possible to find democratic 
communities in totalitarian (autocratic) societies and totalitarian communities in 
democratic societies. A historicical analysis of the United States, a democratic society, 
reveals that a variety of power structures were at one time under the de. facto control of 
local "bosses" or small cohesive groups of elite. During the 1960's, for example, Chicago 
was ruled by its dictator-mayor, Richard Daly. 
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community leadership mav contribute to a greater understanding ot distributions 
in larger and more complex social units, including society at large iHunter, 1953, 
1963;. In the general sense, the term social unit is a very broad one and 
encompasses every level of social functioning. These include a wide variety or 
groups and organizations ot any size, as well as the individual, the smallest 
identitiable unit. Employing sociological terminology, individuals are referred to 
as social actors in this thesis. Some of them have an exclusive monopoly of 
community power, thus it is appropriate to call such actors the "power elite. 
The prevailing body of literature offers various definitions of power that are 
based in either pluralist or elitist conceptualizations. There is no universal 
agreement on the defining characteristics of this concept (Wolfinger, 1960). 
Several attempts at clarifying the meaning of the term and delineating other 
factors associated with the phenomenon of power have been undertaken and are 
discussed in Chapter 2. The primary definition that is central to this thesis is as 
follows: Community power is the structure(s) through which social processes 
operate that permits some individuals to mobilize others for the purpose of 
arrecting their actions towards themselves, or towards organic or inorganic 
matter ^Hunter, 1953). 
Overview 
Chapter 2 focuses upon community power theory, as well as a variety of 
supportive empirical studies. The reputational and decisional methods employed 
6This term was initially proposed and introduced into sociological literature by C. Wright 
Mills (1959), although he was more concerned with powerful and influential actors at the 
national level rather than those from local arenas. In addition, by focusing specifically 
upon American leadership during the 1950's, Mills concluded that the "power elite" 
consisted of leaders from the political, economic and military sectors. These actors may 
also be referred to as the "ruling" or "governing elite" (Pareto, 1935, 1987). 
bv contemporary researcners are examined in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 explores a 
wide range or criticisms and assumptions associated with each theory and method. 
In Chapter 5, a reputational model which includes a component designed to 
measure the perception of community power within specific settings is proposed. 
Its implications and prospect for future research are addressed in the sixth and 
final chapter. 
CHAPTER 2 
COMMUNITY POWER: STRUCTURE AND THEORY 
Within sociological literature, various theories and methodological approaches 
to the measurment ot community power have been proposed. This mandates an 
examination ot alternative paradigms in order to develop a complete 
understanding or the phenomenon. 
Community power may be regarded as both an independent and a dependent 
variable. As a dependent variable, its distribution is associated with the 
community's social environment and situational factors ie.g., social change and 
social crises;. This distribution is affected by the social requirements of the 
community, specific conditions and a variety of factors contributing to social 
change. Thus, local power structures are manifestations of community social 
environments. As an independent variable, community power affects access to 
various social resources at the local level, including economic resources. It is 
rrequently employed by community actors, groups and classes to monopolize and 
control the distribution ot goods. By doing this, they tend to reserve the bulk of 
the most valued resources for themselves and limit access to others. 
This chapter reviews the literature pertaining to community power. It is 
divided into two parts. The first focuses on the structural arrangement of 
community power and the perception of leadership at the local level. Relative 
theoretical foundations are pursued in the second. Within the tirst section of 
Part I. the author outlines different types of community power structures. The 
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second explores a typology proposed by Bonjean and Olson U964; and Bon.iean and 
Carter <1965/ that tocuses upon the reputation ror leadership among 
"knowledqables"—social actors familiar with the distribution ot community 
powei and/or in the community at large. The third section addresses social 
stratification as a tactor contributing to the perception of community power. 
This entails an analysis of reputations among various ethnic and racial strata. 
Part 11 presents a discussion of elitism and pluralism, two alternative 
perspectives employed by contemporary social scientists. 
Part I: The Structure of Community Power 
Types of Community Power Structures 
Before exploring the different types ot configurations that may be found in 
the community, it is necessary for researchers to agree in respect to the features 
and defining characteristics they have in common. According to Warren (1977;, a 
power structure is a "network of actors" who have an unlimited "access to" social 
resources and sanctions. Although some sanctions are regarded as positive and 
serve as rewards for socially promoted behavior that is within the boundaries of 
a society's norms, others are negative and punishment for its violation.^ By 
controlling their distribution, local power elite tend to have an impact upon the 
* These are general or generic definitions advocated by the author and serve the purpose or 
this thesis. Other sources, however, offer more specific definitions that are applicable 
only to certain contexts. According to Warren U977), a positive sanction is a "reward" to 
an actor tor "changing" his or her "position on a particular issue," supporting another 
independently of personal perspective. On the other hand he views negative sanctions as 
"potential punishments" tor refusing to "change" such positions. 
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behavior or individuals and groups, as well as the pattern or social action and 
interaction iWarren, 1977). Social interaction among a diverse collection or actors 
is reterred to as social organization. These actors include individuals and 
groups, which consist or both inrormai ones and a number or formal organizations 
at the local level. According to Walton (1971;, there is a relationship between a 
commumtvs social organization and the type of structure that governs it. This 
organization mav be a tactor in the distribution or power, or vice versa. Specific 
decisions generated by this structure may be consequences of social organization. 
Simply, local power structures are systems of decision making that are influenced 
by social organization and may ultimately affect the lives of people in the 
community. Social organization (specifically, the interactive relationships among 
individuals and organizations) is also a manifestation of community power 
structure, directly leading to the decision making process which has an impact 
upon the community at large (Form & Sauer, 1960). 
There are two general approaches to the analysis of power structures: (a) the 
chotomic (categorical) approach, and (b) the continual approach. The chotomic 
approach is employed only ror conceptual purposes and is a way of portraying 
ideal types. It describes the nature and major characteristics of different 
configurations in significantly distinct terms, acknowledging discriminative or 
discrete rorms or community power. Through the chotomic approach, specific 
types of leadership are examined in relative isolation from all others. In society, 
actual distributions of power are likely to appear along a "continuum," with 
graduated differences among local structures. Being aware of this, theorists and 
researchers who focus their attention in such a direction are said to use a 
continual approach. This approach is grounded in an evolutionary model 
11 
oonsisunq or a series or structures, with one type succeeding another iNix &. 
Dudley, 1966; Nix. Shoemaker & Singh. 1967; Platt. 1969;. 
The prevaiiinq oody or literature <Bartn, 1962; Nix, 1969; Rossi, 1960. 1966; 
Walton, 1966. 1966, 1971; otters similar typoioqies ot community power 
structures isee Figure 1;. There are rour ideal types: la) the pyramidal (focused, 
convergent, monolithic or unitary;, (b; the factional (.divergent, polylithic or 
"ciique-oased truncated pyramid"), \c) the coalitional Tcaucus rule"), and id) the 
amorphous idisorqamzed). Each ot these is found in different communities. Some 
are qovernea oy pyramidal structures in which power is monopolized bv a single 
individual or group who dictates virtually every important policy and decision. In 
these structures, such decisions are implemented by a number of subordinate 
actors. This type of contiguration is generally not responsive to the needs and 
demands of the public, including racial and gender strata. Nor is it concerned 
with serving the best interests of the community. Social participation in the 
process ot decision making is not encouraged by local leaders. They are not likely 
to solicit input rrom residents. That is, these elite will probably not submit 
their decisions to "reterenda," formal measures of legitimation bv the people. 
Tne pyramidal power structure is characteristic of homogenous communities and 
those lacking economic diversity. 
Other communities have factional structures. Such configurartions consist of 
various groups ie.g., interest groups; and/or individuals who compete tor 
community power. In some cases, these factions tocus their attention on a 
limited number or issues and exercise power within specific arenas of policy and 
decision making, in others, however, they do address the same issues and thus 
use their power to influence relevant policies and decisions. 
1 ^ 
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There are two types or ractional power structures: bifactional and 
multifactional. One that is bifactional consists of two competitive factions, each 
trying to control the distribution of a community's resources. In a multifactional 
system, on the other hand, there are more than two factions who vie for such 
control. Both types of configuration have in common the following factors: (a) in 
some situations, power is exercised within specific domains concerned with 
different social issues; tb) in others, power is employed to influence the general 
direction or policy and decision making and the status of every issue. 
In communities with coalitional structures, power is distributed among various 
individuals and/or groups who tend to cooperate with one another in the 
development or community policy. The leadership of a number of influential 
groups and organizations may merge to form a network or coalition, which 
rrequently solidifies, crystallizes and enhances the power of each. In this 
structure, decisions are reached through a consensus of leaders. Many of these 
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actors rend to rocus upon the preservation or common interests ie.g., community 
power;, thus cooperate with one another to ensure that a monopoly does not occur. 
To do this, they may combine social resources ^e.g., economic or financial 
resources;, mobilizing them to promote the ideals shared bv virtually every 
member or the coalition. 
The amorphous power structure is an ideal type which may not exist in reality. 
It is very likely that researchers who depict such configurations do so only 
because they have tailed to locate other forms of leadership. They tend to be 
characterized by informal organization. In communities with amorphous 
structures, there is no clear and identifiable pattern of policy and decision 
making. Power tends to be diffuse, and the process of shaping policies and 
decisions is an informal one. Generally, this structure may be found in 
heterogeneous communities with economic diversity. In contemporary society, the 
economic systems or different communities are interrelated; often they form a 
single structure that serves as a network of economic resources ie.g., in 
metropolitan areasj. Within this network, groups and actors exchange resources 
amongst themselves. As a result, each constituent community is affected. Its 
economic structure, namely its infrastructure, influences and is influenced by 
economic relationships with other communities. This factor is generally 
attributed to urbanization and industrialization brought about due to the efforts 
of social actors from both the private and public sectors. The "absentee 
ownership" of local business and industry may affect a community's 
infrastructure, which, in turn, may affect the composition of its power structure. 
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An Evolutionary Approach to Community Power 
In the beginning of this chapter it was noted that the chotomic approach is 
only a method for categorizing ideal types of power structures. The fact that 
there are graduated differences among a wide range of configurations is 
justification tor the employment of the continual approach. As previously 
suggested, this approach is grounded in an evolutionary model consisting of a 
series of structures with one type succeeding another. According to Nix and 
Dudley ii966) and Nix, Shoemaker and Singh (1967), the community power structure 
evolves rrom the pyramidal to the amorphous to the factional (Platt, 1969). This 
model is presented in Figure 2. Although Nix (1969) does not identify coalitlonal 
structures, his model may be adapted to include them. As portrayed in Figure 3, 
community power structure may thus evolve from the pyramidal to the amorphous 
to either the factional or coalitlonal. 
The structural evolution of power may be related to changes in social values, 
perspective and ideology. Platt (1969) implies that the pattern and distribution 
of community power is connected with the prevalent perspective and values of 
local residents. A change in this perspective and value system may affect the 
composition of a community s structure, as well as the extent of participation by 
its residents. Platt attributes changes in social values to "external" factors that 
may have an impact upon local ideology and perspectives. These factors include 
community social and administrative programs sponsored by higher levels of 
government, specifically regional and national governments. Collectively, 
different levels of government constitute the public sector. "External" factors 
may also include a variety of social and administrative programs originating with 
the private (business and industrial) sector. Relatively large industries and 
businesses rrequently establish branches in the community and contribute to 
15 
pyramidal  > amorphous  > factional 
Figure 2. The evolution or a community power structure based on Nix and Dudley (1966) 
and Nix, Shoemaker and Singh (1967); refer to Platt (1969;. 
 > factional 
pyramidal  > amorphous  > or 
 > coa1i t i ona1 
Figure 3. A moditication or Nix's evolutionary model of community power structure. 
economic development and pluralism. This tends to result in a relatively equal 
distribution of power which is shared by various actors. Economic development is 
associated with pluralism, a feature of both factional (Barth, 1962; Nix, 1969; 
Rossi, 1960; Walton, 1966, 1971) and coalitional structures (Rossi, 1960; Walton, 
1966. 1971). As previously discussed, the factional structure is characterized by 
the competition for community power by any number of interest groups. The 
coalitional power structure (Rossi, 1960; Walton, 1966, 1971), on the other hand, 
is a coalition or network of individuals and/or groups that cooperate in the 
development of local policies and decisions. 
Another tactor that affects social perspectives and fosters the development 
of pluralism is the interactive pattern of residents from different communities. 
They are likely to interact with one another on either a direct or indirect basis. 
Indirect social interaction occurs via the printed and electronic media. By 
definition, the media constitute a system through which information, including 
information concerning alternative perspectives, is transferred among a wide 
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range or actors. Interaction among residents from neighboring communities may 
contribute to the development of pluralism in each. Some "pluralistic structures" 
emphasize the relative importance of their participation in the decision making 
process. 
Two studies of Oglethorpe County, Georgia (Nix, Shoemaker and Singh, 1967; 
Platt, 1969) note a change in the composition of the community's power structure. 
The earlier study reveals the presence of an amorphous structure (Barth, 1962; 
Nix, 1969; Rossi, 1960; Walton, 1966, 1971) characterized by informal 
organization. In this configuration, power is both diffuse and tends to be 
exercised more or less on an informal basis. 
Platt suggests that Ogelthorpe had previously been governed by a pyramidal 
structure (Barth, 1962; Nix, 1969; Rossi, 1960; Walton, 1966, 1971) consisting of 
"informal cliques" and local "bosses" with total control over community affairs. 
Ggelthorpe's power elite tend to be members of these "cliques," monopolize 
community power, and formulate virtually every major policy and decisions in the 
community. According to Nix, Shoemaker and Singh (1967), Oglethorpe's 
amorphous structure retains some of the characteristics of pyramidal power 
structures, including community government by "informal cliques." The retention 
of pyramidal features may be attributed to a "localite" perspective embraced by 
the community's population, which focuses upon social interests and processes 
occurring in the community (Merton, 1949, 1957). 
A replication of the study suggests that Oglethorpe's amorphous power 
structure has become more "pluralistic." That is, it has evolved into a 
"pluralistic structure," with community power distributed among a variety of 
actors ^Platt, 1969). This power may be exercised informally by Oglethorpe's 
residents, who may thus participate in community decision making to some extent. 
17 
Qglethorpe's "pluralistic power structure" may be either factional or 
coalitional. While factional structures (Barth, 1962; Nix, 1969; Rossi, 1960; 
Walton, 1966, 1971) are characterized by the competition for community power, 
those that are coalitional (Rossi, 1960; Walton, 1966, 1971) consist of networks 
of individuals and/or groups that cooperate in its exercise, specifically through 
their involvement in the decision making process. 
Platt attributes the development of pluralism in Oglethorpe to situational 
factors or changes occurring within the community's social environment. These 
changes reflect transitions in the predominant perspective, ideology and system 
of values. According to Platt, various "external" factors have produced changes 
in the views and values of a majority of Qglethorpe's population, thus 
encouraging the redistribution of power. He suggests that the public has adopted 
a "cosmopolitan" perspective, which focuses upon social processes generally 
occurring outside the community, though with a potential impact upon community 
affairs (Merton, 1949, 1957) that includes the development of a "pluralistic 
structure." 
Some factors affecting Oglethorpe, its inhabitants and their views have been 
community social and administrative programs initiated at higher levels of 
government. Such programs may also be sponsored by a variety of business and 
industrial organizations from the private sector. Relatively large businesses 
from urban communities, including Athens, may have established branches in 
Oglethorpe, facilitating economic development and pluralism. In addition, certain 
other changes in the local economy may have enhanced the redistribution of power 
even further. 
Another important factor that apparently had an impact upon the people of 
Oglethorpe was the extent of their interaction with those from other communities 
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found within the Atlanta-Athens metropolitan area. At the time of the Platt 
study, a significant number of them commuted to Athens on a regular basis. The 
residents of both communities interact and exchange resources within the 
economic market located in the business district of Athens. They are consumers 
and consume a variety of commodities acquired within this market. Platt notes 
that many of Oglethorpe's residents are employed in Athens and thus receive 
capital in exchange for services. These actors also generate capital for various 
business and industrial organizations, which may promote economic development 
within the Atlanta-Athens metropolitan area, including Oglethorpe. 
Platt further suggests that the media may have contributed to the 
redistribution of community power, thus the development of pluralism. As noted 
earlier, the media constitute a system of communication through which 
information uncluding information concerning alternative social perspectives) is 
transmitted. Within metropolitan areas, the media transmit information 
throughout a network of communities, fostering structural changes in each, 
including Oglethorpe. 
A change in the composition of the community power structure of Richmond, 
Georgia is also evident in two consecutive studies conducted by Nix and Dudley 
(1966) and Platt (1969). The earlier study reveals the development of a relatively 
equal distribution of power among a variety of actors. In a replication of the Nix 
and Dudley study, Platt notes the presence of a functional "pluralistic power 
structure" in Richmond, thus characterized by power sharing in relatively equal 
proportions. This structure may be either factional or coalitional. 
19 
Community Leadership 
Community power is a manifestation of leadership at the local level. In the 
community, leaders tend to undertake different approaches to its exercise. 
Various typologies of leadership are presented in the literature. A typology 
central to this thesis is proposed by Bonjean (1963, 1964), Bonjean & Olson (1964), 
Bonjean and Grimes U974), and Bonjean and Carter U965). They differentiate 
leaders Dv social class, social status, the reputation for community power, and 
the levels ot power they actually wield.^ Bonjean (1964) employs "two measures 
of social class," occupational position and property ownership; and "three 
measures of" social "status," educational level,^ formal leadership roles and 
"length of residence in the community." Occupational position and ownership are 
associated with income and may be regarded as variables of economic status. A 
leader has a reputation for community power if identified by "knowledgeables" 
("judges") and/or the community at large. Within the context of power studies, a 
"knowledgeable" is defined as one who is familiar with the structure and 
distribution of power. Bonjean and others distinguish among three types of 
leaders, those who are visible, concealed and symbolic.^ The visible leader 
possesses community power and frequently occupies a position in the community's 
zThis model is based on Weber's typology of social stratification iBonjean & Grimes, 1974; 
Gerth & Mills, 1946). 
^Although Bonjean employs education as a "measure of" social "status," it was not a major 
factor in his comparative study of Burlington, Winston-Salem, Charlotte and High Point, 
North Carolina. No significant difference was found among leaders' educational levels 
(Bonjean, 1964). 
^Some religious leaders and community activists, such as civil rights leaders, may be 
classified as symbolic leaders, although Bonjean and others do not raise this issue. 
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formal structure. This power is recognized in the community at large, including a 
sample or actors tamiliar with the pattern of local leadership. Althougn 
concealed leaders also wield power, they have such reputations only among 
"knowledgeables." The symbolic leader, on the other hand, does not have 
community power. Yet he is perceived as being powerful by the general public. 
Most visible and symbolic leaders belong to the upper stratum and have higher 
social statuses than those who are concealed. According to Bonjean (1963), some 
concealed leaders may be members of the upper class or possess a relatively high 
social status, but never both. He notes that visible and symbolic leaders tend to 
be "major property owners" and occupy key positions with large business 
organizations^ at the local level. This suggests that they are from upper income 
brackets and possess relatively high economic statuses.^ On status variables, 
these leaders tend to have resided in the community for many years. Both have 
also occupied formal positions in power structures at the local and state levels 
(Bonjean, 1964). 
The Empowerment of Groups Traditionally 
Excluded from Community Decision Making 
Ethnicity: Power Along Racial and Ethnic lines 
Racial and gender strata tend to vary in the amount(s) of community power 
they wield. In addition, their reputations for leadership fluctuate along a 
^From Bonjean's perspective, a large business is operationally defined as one that 
employs a minimum of 100 people. 
^Although this is not always the case. Some religious leaders (e.g., Protestant ministers) 
may possess reputations for power in the community at large and are thus symbolic 
leaders, but yet lack the wealth of local actors with higher socioeconomic statuses (R. 
Branch, personal communication, 1993). 
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continuum, as do the perceptions they themselves have or local power 
distributions. Social actors are perceived differently when identified bv a number 
of racial or ethnic groups. They are more likely to have reputations for 
community power among members of their own strata. A leader's reputation may 
be associated with his or her ethnic extraction. In the community, individuals 
tend to respect and identify with leaders who share their heritage. On this 
basis, they perceive these actors as being powerful and influential, likely naming 
them during reputational studies and on social surveys. Settles U984) has 
compared the identification of local leaders by the White, Hispanic and 
African-American populations of Adams-Morgan, a community of Washington, D.C. 
The sample consisted of eighteen subjects, six of which were Caucasian, Hispanic 
and African-American, respectively. Caucasians identified leaders and 
individuals from the community at large, specifically those who actually did wield 
power. In addition, they named local organizations which were influential from 
their perspectives. 
The Settles study also notes that African-Americans tend to identify other 
African-Americans as community leaders. They socially interact and identify 
with leaders from African-American descent more often than with others. 
Therefore, they may expect them to protect their interests in the community. 
Hispanics were found to identify Hispanic leaders. They interact and may 
identify with such actors, also expecting them to protect their interests. Both 
Hispanics and African-Americans tend to interact and socially identify with 
neighborhood leaders, thus are likely to name those thev believe will protect 
neighborhood interests. 
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Part II: Theories of Community Power 
Stratification-Elite Theory 
Having explored the different types of leadership, power structures and 
supportive empirical data, it is necessary to pursue their theoretical foundations. 
This section focuses on alternative orientations and paradigms of community 
power. Elite theories developed within the discipline of sociology are examined 
first. These include two primary theories—functional-elite theory and 
contlict-elite theory. A third elite theory (Lenski, 1966) which "synthesizes" the 
functional and conflict perspectives is also presented. 
According to elite theorists, community power is distributed in unequal 
proportions. Local structures are seen as being centralized, pyramidal and 
monolithic. The task of developing virtually every major policy and decision is 
under the auspices of either a clique or one or more powerful actors. In general, 
power tends to be the domain of the upper social and economic classes. 
Communities may use revenue to maintain the leisure and living standard of the 
elite. For example, local resources may be allocated for social functions and 
activities primariiy associated with the upper stratum. Community leaders are 
trequentiy granted preferential access to financial resources for personal living 
expenses, as well as for lodging, travel and transportation to various activities 
in other communities under the presumption that this is adventageous to the 
community. Access may be obtained through either direct or indirect means (e.g., 
the reimbursement of previously satisfied expenses), but the beneficiary is the 
community's power elite, not its general population. These influentials tend to 
have relatively unlimited access to resources and the structure of power, 
ensuring that their programs and goals are placed in motion. The extent and 
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domain of government may increase with greater spending (Williams, 1977). 
Although different communities are characterized by different "configurations of 
power," decisions are frequently shaped by covert actors who are not members of 
the orficiai structure. 
A Functional Theory of Community Power'' 
Within elite theory, there is no universal agreement concerning the nature of 
inequities in the distribution of community power. There are two primary schools 
or thougnt that serve to illustrate the elite in different respects. The first is 
tunctionalism, which emphasizes the adaptive aspects of inequality in 
communities and society as a whole. According to elite theorists in general, the 
distribution of social resources—including the resource of community power—in 
contemporary society is controlled by the power elite. These actors allocate 
resources tor the maintenance of the upper stratum, a practice that has become 
legitimated through the perceived social responsibility of this class. According 
to functional-elite theory, members of the upper class fulfill vital functions, 
performing social roles requiring expert knowledge in various arenas, including 
the administration of community government. This legitimates greater access to 
community resources by local power elite. 
According to the functional-elite perspective, order and stability persist 
when the community is stratified and strata vary in their abilities to obtain 
social resources, including community power. The formation of strata is 
''This discussion focuses upon local level arenas. For general applications and emphases 
of functional theory refer to Clelland (1986), Davis (1948), Davis and Moore (1945), Matras 
(1984) and Nanda (1980, 1987). 
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instrumental to the preservation of social order in the community. Integration is 
accomplished through a collective consensus of values and ideals. Complex 
societies, as well as their constituent communities, are affected by a variety of 
environmental factors. Key positions in local power structures are generally 
occupied by qualified personnel. In capitalist society, such structures tend to be 
legitimated within the private sector. Elites from industry and business may 
serve in an advisory capacity. They possess the expertise that is frequently 
solicited by community leaders. A system of incentive serving to reward them for 
their expert advice and knowledge is often instituted. This may consist of a wide 
range of measures--such as financial appropriation and political 
appointment—which are often employed to influence policy and decision making by 
formal leadership structures. 
Functional theory is supported by a number of empirical studies found in the 
literature on community power. 
Case studies. Investigating the reputation for community power in Atlanta® 
during the early 1950's. Hunter (1953) concluded that the local structure was 
pyramid shaped. Hunter's depiction of Atlanta's power structure is a landmark 
case study that established precedent for subsequent studies grounded in 
functional theory.9 As suggested earlier, pyramidal structures are characterized 
by a monopoly of power which is exercised by a single individual or group who 
0In his study, Hunter does not rerer to Atlanta by name, but rather identifies the 
community by pseudonym (Regional Citv), a standard practice during the 1950's. 
'Some of these are cross-cultural studies from the field of political anthropology. Both 
political sociologists and political anthropologists have documented a wide range of 
configurations. 
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□ ominates and formulates every major pohcv and decision in the community 
iBarth. 1962; Nix, 1969; Rossi, 1960; Walton, 1966, 1971). In Atlanta, as in 
many other communities, formal decision makers tend to be influenced—either 
directly or indirectly—by economic actors from the private sector. This sector 
controls a variety of resources which are frequently employed to secure, maintain 
and increase its level of power. According to Hunter, community power structures 
consist of three components, the "upper limits power" structure, the "lower limits 
power" structure, and the under-structure. Major policies and decisions are made 
by members of the "upper limits" structure, who are the power elite. Hunter 
observed that Atlanta's elite consisted primarily of upper-class businessmen who 
influenced and controlled the development of local policies and decisions. They 
generally did not occupy formal positions of leadership, although some had been 
members of various organizations which may have provided them with social 
connections that translated into political and economic power. On the most part, 
Atlanta's business sector functioned to preserve the collective interests of its 
actors. Local power elite were cohesive, a characteristic that generally indicates 
a sense of class consciousness. 
At the time of the study, there were a number of informal cliques**-1 operating 
within the business sector of Atlanta. By definition, a clique functions to secure 
the interests of its members. Cliques frequently form alliances with other 
cliques and cooperate to secure common interests. In Atlanta, key clique actors 
were associated with principal businesses and community organizations. One's 
^In Community Power Structure. Hunter used the terms clique and crowd interchangeably. 
The reason for employing the latter word was that it had been part of the vocabulary of 
his respondents. 
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power may be limited only to certain situations, thus deference to this actor is 
expressed only in these contexts, not in others. Formal leaders may receive 
financial support for a wide range of community projects. It is argued that they 
tend to be primarily responsive to the demands of the upper stratum (Trounstine 
& Christensen, 1982). 
Atlanta's under-structure consisted of visible actors who occupied positions 
in local agencies and bureaus. Most of the personnel were professionals, experts 
and specialists. Thev tended to possess relatively high social status and 
prestige, although their power levels were relatively low. In addition, these 
actors were members of various types of organizations located in the community. 
Visible leaders were frequently responsible for implementing policies and 
decisions originating with the power elite. 
Community Power and Conflict Theory** 
Conflict theory focuses upon the development of social conflict, an attribute 
of social inequality, including unequal power allocations at the local level. From 
this perspective, communities are characterized by social stratification and the 
unbalanced distribution of community power and other resources. Social strata 
include social classes which compete for these resources in order to further class 
interests. Because the community has a limited number of resources, access 
tends to be relatively exclusive. Their distribution is at the disposal of the 
power elite, memoers of the upper stratum who mobilize them primarily to 
llThis discussion focuses upon local level arenas. For general applications and emphases 
of conflict theory refer to Collins (1971, 1975, 1979), Dahrendorf (1958, 1959, 1961, 1967), 
Kloss (1986), Matras (1984), Nanda (1980, 1987), Turner (1991) and Wanner (1986). 
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preserve class interests. Further, access to local leadership structures is 
controlled exclusively by the ruling class tor the ruling class. It retains 
community power for its memDers and limits access by the non-ruling class. The 
power elite monopolize, employ and exercise power to subjugate and control social 
action and behavior by the underclasses, collectively referring to all those actors 
who lack vital resources. 
The social resources of the ruling class are the social interests of the ruling 
class, as well as the interests of the non-ruling class. There is a disparity 
between social interests and access to social resources. The fact that the 
numoer of available resources is limited tends to be a contributing factor in the 
development of interclass conflict. The elite tend to undertake measures to 
preserve and increase their levels of power, as well as to pursue various other 
interests. According to conflict theorists, the underclass does not acknowledge 
the monopoly of community power by the ruling class as legitimate and therefore 
strives to rerorm the prevalent distribution practices, securing access to social 
resources for themselves. To do this, they frequently employ extreme tactics and 
other forms or power not considered legitimate by the upper stratum. 
Social conflict is associated with repression and exploitation through a 
variety of tactics and the exericise of power. Both conflict and power are 
functions of social order. In the community, as in the larger society, order is 
maintained through various institutions, including the political and economic 
institutions. These institutions serve to control the behavior of social actors 
and maintain the group in power (Kerbo, 1991). Social conflict and community 
power are related through a system of positive feedback. Each variable affects 
the other: An increase in community power by a social class increases class 
conflict; an increase in class conflict may increase the community power of a 
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social class. The greater the disparity, the greater the conrlict; the greater the 
contlict, the greater the inequality of power at the local level. 
Within conflict theory, there are two general orientations, paradigms or 
schools of thought: Critical-conflict theory and uncritical-conflict theory. These 
alternatives vary in several respects. Each has a different interpretation 
concerning the nature of social conflict and the unilateral distribution of 
community power, as well as the prospect for social equality. According to 
uncritical-conflict theorists, social conflict and power monopolies are 
"inevitable." Individuals are perceived as "selfish" by "nature." Social conflict 
and competition may result in a change in the configuration of community power, 
but this is only a transfer from one elite group to another. Within this paradigm, 
there are a variety of theories (Kerbo, 1991). The following is a discussion of 
Dahrendorf's dialectical conflict theory. 
Dahrendorf's dialectical theory of social conflict. Dahrendorf (1958, 1959, 
1961, 1967) attributes social conflict, power inequities and the competition for 
social power to the development of "imperatively coordinated associations" 
(ICA's). These associations are organizational systems in which the power of 
some actors (the power elite) is legitimated, thus employed to dominate and 
control the behavior of others. According to Turner's (1991) interpretation of 
Dahrendorf, the community itself may be regarded as an "imperatively coordinated 
association."^ At the local level there are a variety of organizations 
"characterized by power relationships" that are also "imperatively coordinated 
associations." Social conflict and the competition for community power tend to 
^For a discussion refer to Turner (1991). 
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occur on a perpetual basis. According to conflict theorists, there are two general 
classes of social roles: superiors and subordinates. A superior may be an 
organizational leader, as well as a community leader. While this actor possesses 
community power and generates local policies and decisions, subordinates are the 
executors of these policies and decisions. 
Superiors and subordinates are characterized by different social interests. 
Superior interests focus upon the preservation of the prevalent distribution of 
community power, and those of subordinates are directed towards its 
"redistribution." If the perception of such disparity becomes apparent, the result 
is a development of two alliances, factions or "conflict groups" which compete for 
community power. A "resolution" of this conflict can only occur through the 
"redistribution" of power in the community, an "imperatively coordinated 
association." When this happens, social actors may exchange roles: Former 
subordinates gain power, which is legitimated through formal mechanisms (e.g., 
local elections;, and former superiors are subjugated to an inferior status. Thus 
former subordinates become superiors, local power elite, while former superiors 
constitute a new underclass of subordinates. In addition, a transformation of 
social interests also occurs within the "imperatively coordinated association," 
with each group assuming those interests formerly espoused bv the other. If the 
perception of a disparity in interests again becomes apparent, then a reformation 
of alliances, factions or "conflict groups" tends to occur, evoking another period 
of conflict and competition for community power, as well as its "redistribution" 
(Turner, 1991). 
According to critical-conflict theorists, social change and equality can occur in 
society, as well as its constituent communities. Their view is that an "equitable" 
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distritntion or community power is possible. Individuals may be regarded as 
being "either selfish or unselfish," but they tend to be "altruistic" and 
"cooperative" in most cases.^ Social institutions are perceived as maladaptive 
and exploitive components of society, as well as the community. Within 
critical-conflict theory, there are a number of variations (Kerbo, 1991). The 
following is a discussion of Marx's political and economic theory of social 
conflict. 
Marx s politicai-economic theory of social conflict. Marx (1932) and Marx and 
Engels (1930, 1932, 1963) attribute social stratification, conflict and power 
inequities to the social structure of society. This structure consists of three 
components: la; an infrastructure, (b) a structure, and (c> a superstructure.^ 
According to Marxists, the infrastructure of a society affects its structure, which 
in turn affects its superstructure (Lefebvre, 1966, 1969; Persico, 1990). The 
infrastructure consists of the "forces of production," such as technology, 
expertise, equipment te.g., machinery), material resources and methods of 
production lAppeibaum, 1988). These forces are employed to produce social 
resources, including economic resources. 
The infrastructure has an affect on the "relations of production," the 
political, economic and structural relationship between the ruling and working 
classes (Lefebvre, 1966, 1969). Marx and Engels refer to the ruling class as the 
bourgeois and the working class as the proletariat. In capitalist society, the 
ruling class consists of bourgeoisie or capitalists who control the distribution of 
^Environmental "factors" play a role in the development of altruism in individuals (Kerbo, 
1991). 
14Lefebvre 11966, 1969) employs the term substructure in lieu of infrastructure. 
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social resources (Engels, 1930, 1963). These actors monQpolize community power, 
including political and economic power, which is employed to limit access to such 
resources, reserving the profits from production for only themselves. 
The power of the ruling class is sanctioned and legitimated by the 
superstructure tLenin, 1932), a system of social institutions and social ideology 
iLefebvre, 1966, 1969). Social institutions include the political (Lenin, 1932) and 
economic institutions, as well as the institution of religion. They promote the 
social, political and economic ideology of the ruling class. This ideology focuses 
upon the preservation of class interests. Specifically, it legitimates the 
monopoly of social resources and community power by capitalists, as well as the 
subordination of the working class (Appelbaum, 1988). 
According to Marx, the economic condition of a society has an affect on power 
distributions. Economic instability is a manifestation of social conflict and 
serves as the basis for the redistribution of power. Marx predicts that social, 
political and economic equality will take place in every society. Such a system is 
referred to as a communist state. However, this depends largely upon the 
organized efforts of the masses: The proletariat. There are several stages 
through which equality is achieved. First, the proletariat engage in armed 
conflict with the bourgeoisie. They employ revolutionary methods and tactics to 
overthrows the ruling class by force (Engels, 1930, 1963; Ryazanoff, 1930, 1963). 
After this has been accomplished, society passes through a transitional period. 
Marx refers to this phase as "the dictatorship of the proletariat." During 
transition, the proletariat monopolize power and take total control of the 
political and economic system. These actors exchange roles with the bourgeoisie: 
The proletariat become the rulers, and the bourgeois becomes a subordinate 
class. Social conflict and economic instability may occur during transition. The 
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bourgeoisie may attempt to regain their power through counterrevolution. 
However, this period can end only when all opposition has been suppressed 
(Ryazanott, 1930, 1963), class conflicts have been resolved and the economy has 
stabilized. 
The final stage is the establishment of a communist state characterized by 
social, political and economic equality. Social classes are eliminated. Every 
actor has equal access to social resources, including political and economic 
resources. In order to guarantee these ideals, a new superstructure must be put 
in place. Its institutions must enforce a social, political and economic ideology 
associated with total equality. Communist social ideology legitimates the 
collective ownership of social resources, including community power.^ 
Holistic and Eclectic Approaches to Community Power Theory 
Functionalism and conflict theory are contradictory perspectives on community 
power and the power elite. Each may explain different aspects of this concept 
and be applicable to different community environments, as well as periods of 
social change characterized by transitions of power among different elite groups. 
A more general, inclusive and holistic theory that addresses both social conflict 
and stability, the environmental relationship between these variables and 
situational variation (e.g., social change, social crises) is required. Some 
contemporary theorists seek to resolve this theoretical discrepancy by 
incorporating elements of each approach. 
^For further discussion or additional information about Marx's theory see also McClellan 
(1977), Nanda (1980, 1987) and Wolff (1984), 
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Two related concepts employed to describe the association between power 
structures and social environments are social (cultural) and situational relativity. 
The term social relativity ^ refers to the relationship of a community's 
configuration to its environment. These structures are (social) adaptations to 
specific types of environments. They are generally flexible and suited to the 
needs of the community. Thus power monopolies are also adaptable to some 
environments, but maladaptive to others. In the community, as in the larger 
society, social environments tend to change through the occurrence of unexpected 
events (e.g., social and economic crises, ere.). The relationship between changing 
environments and patterns of leadership is referred to as situational relativity. 
Although some structures appear to be rigid on the surface, a systemic and 
structural breakdown that will eventually lead to a transition in power tends to 
occur with the passage of time. Social stability may be assured in communities 
characterized by power monopolies, but these monopolies have been known to 
foster instability during periods of crisis, conflict and unrest.^ 
Lenski (1966) and Matras (1984) document various approaches that incorporate 
or assimilate elements of functional and conflict theories of inequality, including 
inequities in the distribution of power. The following is a discussion of Lenski's 
*
6This concept was developed and pioneered by anthropologists. For further discussion 
about social or cultural relativity refer to Koch (1986) and Nanda (1980, 1987). 
^The pattern of exercising power is different in stable and unstable environments, thus 
distinct terms are used to describe the process in each. Although there are a number of 
typologies, one focuses specifically on the issue of environmental stability. It 
differentiates between two types of social power, episodic and perpetual. One who 
exercises perpetual power does so on a regular basis, as long the social environment 
remains relatively stable. If changes occur, however, certain situational factors may make 
it possible for otherwise powerless actors to sway episodic power. 
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theory or social and economic distribution. 
Social distnoution. Lenski vl966) proposes a theory of social inequality that 
"synthesizes" certain aspects ot the functional and conflict perspectives, 
focusing specifically upon the means of production. According to Lenski, a 
society's mode of production is a manifestation of its economic structure, the 
dominant form of technology employed in the production of social resources. He 
suggests that the term technology must be distinguished from other aspects of 
economics. Anthropologists document four primary modes of production, each 
representing a different level of complexity in terms of economic and 
technological development. These are hunting and gathering, horticulture 
(extensive agriculture), agrarian (intensive agriculture) and industry. Each mode 
is associated with a different system of economic distribution. The extent of 
social inequality varies among societies with distinct modes of production and 
distribution <V. R. Persico, personal communication, 1990). Lenski's basic model 
of inequality in allocating resources is as follows: A society's technology 
affects its economic organization, which affects its political organization, which, 
in turn, affects the pattern of distributing resources (e.g., economic and material 
resources;. In addition, he notes that a number of other variables, including 
social ideology, environmental factors and leadership characteristics, may also 
have an impact upon social, political and economic organization, as well as the 
level of inequality. According to Lenski, ideology and the attributes of leaders 
tend to be particularly important in more complex societies. 
In society, the extent of inequality is related to the volume of available 
resources. According to Lenski, there are two "laws of distribution." The first is 
associated with functionalism and characteristic of the hunting and gathering 
mode of production. The second is based on the conflict perspective and 
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applicable to all subsequent modes. The first law states that social actors are 
dependent upon others for "survival" and achieving a wide variety of personal 
objectives, and thus "share" resources (e.g., "products of labor") to ensure 
reciprocation and societal preservation. Although they generally compete for 
such resources, these actors may cooperate to promote the achievement of 
common interests. Lenski suggests that this is necessary not only for "survival," 
but also to attain a number of personal and social "goals." In hunting and 
gathering societies, the least complex mode of production, resources are 
"distributed" to individuals according to their "needs." In addition, the process 
of making decisions is a relatively informal one based on a general "consensus" of 
societal members. 
The second law focuses upon the employment of power in the distributing (a 
significant "portion" of) a society's resource "surplus." Lenski identifies three 
variables associated with the process of social distribution in complex societies: 
power, privilege and prestige. A complex society is characterized by a "surplus" 
of economic resources. The "possession or control" of this "surplus" is referred 
to as privilege. In complex societies, the "distribution of privilege" is affected 
by the "distribution of" social "power." Individuals frequently employ power to 
gain access to and monopolize economic resources, as well as to "control" the 
distribution of a "surplus," an indication of privilege. Lenski's theory also 
acknowledges that some actors may possess altruistic tendencies when 
distributing these resources, but the role of social power is much more intense 
than altruism. In society, both power and privilege have an impact upon the 
distribution of prestige. Thus an individual's power and privilege tend to affect 
his level of prestige. There is a positive "feedback" relationship between social 
power and prestige. Power is regarded as a dependent variable as well as an 
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independent variable. Thus while social power facilitates one's prestige via 
privilege, prestige is a mechanism oy which his or her level of power may be 
enhanced even further. 
As a society progresses to a higher level of complexity, a "surplus" of social 
resources is generated. This promotes conflict and competition for access to 
these resources. Lenski identifies two phases of social conflict. During the 
first, physical force, coercion and militant tactics are employed to overthrow 
societal leaders and the prevalent system of distribution. During the second 
stage of conflict, after all "opposition" has been "eliminated," the victors 
undertake measures to legitimate their power. This involves the establishment 
of social institutions and social ideology. One may secure power by assuming a 
(formal) position of leadership, commanding an ability to influence a wide range 
of decisions and/or through claims to land or other property. The victors also 
reorganize and restructure the social system and pattern of resource 
distribution, with a preponderance of these resources retained for themselves. 
In this system, a relatively low number of actors are able to acquire power, which 
is frequently employed to monopolize access to social resources. Thus resources 
are disproportionately "distributed" to individuals according to their levels of 
power, with those wielding the most—the power elite—securing the greatest 
number. While subordinate actors may gain access to valuable resources, this 
tends to occur only as a "reward" for serving and promoting the interests of the 
elite. 
Lenski further notes that the highest rate of social inequality occurs in 
agrarian societies. Such extreme inequities may decrease with transformation 
into an industrial mode of production. Although social inequality in industrial 
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societies is apparently lower than in agrarian societies, it is relatively high 
nonetheless. 
Pluralism 
Pluralist theory is based upon the democratic ideal of political equality. 
According to this perspective, community power is decentralized and shared by a 
wide variety or actors. It is distributed among various agencies, bureaus, 
organizations and interest groups with "veto power" preventing total domination 
by any party. Local leadership constitutes a polyarchy, a structure that stresses 
plurality in responsibility, accountability, policy development and decision 
making. Members of a democratic society collectively endorse a "democratic 
creed" or civil constitution and legitimate the power of key actors at different 
levels of government. This creed acknowledges social participation and endorses 
equal access to community power structures. Dissent is tolerated by 
powerholders. Differences are resolved through compromise and competition. 
This is exemplified by the ideal American community. Pluralist theory is 
associated with the disciplines of political science (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963, 
1980; Wolfinger, 1960) and economics (Schumpeter, 1942, 1962). 
Process Theory 
The foundation of pluralism is process theory. This perspective focuses upon 
the dynamics of collective power in democratic society. By definition, democracy 
is regarded as an institutionalized system through which opponents compete for 
support by citizens. Competition is perceived as an essential feature of 
community government, and thus necessary if it is to operate effectively. To 
ensure that this system runs smoothly, a bureacracv must be established, along 
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with a series of rules and formal guidelines that define the standards of 
acceptable and proper political behavior (a "code of ethics"). Social participation 
tends to occur through indirect channels. Most actors do not possess the skills 
required for efficient government, so leadership is provided by the power elite. 
Ideally, the power of these elites is legitimated by the community at large, but 
individuals, cliques or factions may influence their policies and decisions. 
Common interests are servea through compromise and arbitration, which 
rrequentiy involves the courts and legislatures at different levels of government. 
Local actors represent constituents on community power structures, and these 
may consist of citizens at large, specific populations (e.g., racial, gender, 
religious, ethnic and/or special interest groups), geographic divisions of the 
community (e.g., wards, precincts), or the power elite.^ 
The structure of power tends to evolve over time. According to Dahl (1961), 
community power is transitional. No single individual or group is capable of 
retaining it on a permanent basis. While some leaders are elected, others are 
appointed. A small number of them may command more power than others, but 
only for a certain period of time. 
From the pluralist perspective, power is a potential feature of society. Dahl 
refers to potential power as "slack power," which may or may not be exercised. 
Generally it is not, however. All citizens possess potential resources that may 
be employed to obtain power in the community. According to Dahl, political 
resources are "noncumulative," meaning that they are controlled by a number of 
actors. No individual is capable of monopolizing them; so a monopoly of 
laFor a complete discussion of process theory refer to Schumpeter (1942, 1962). 
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community power aoes not occur. 
There are two types or elite with "slack power," namely social notaDles and 
economic notables. In the community, economic notables exercise control over a 
network of business and financial organizations. They are primarily members of 
the upper socioeconomic classes, some of whom may be bankers, stockbrokers or 
employed in other occupations dealing with fiscal matters. By contrast, social 
notables are individuals with high social standing (social status) and thus highly 
regarded in the community. A small number of social and economic notables mav 
sway a certain amount of power, yet most do not. 
Pluralists distinguish between two strata of community participation: the 
"political stratum" and the "apolitical stratum." The defining factor that serves 
to differentiate one from the other is extent of political interest. Within the 
"political stratum," the individual actor is generally referred to as homo 
polmcus. or "political man." One from the "apolitical stratum" is known as homo 
civicus. or "civic man" (Ricci, 1971). 
The "political stratum" is concerned with political activity. It is 
heterogeneous, consisting of a small number of political actors. Homo poiiticus 
is politically active and may be a visible leader within the public sector. Some of 
these actors occupy positions in community power structures, as well as in 
political parties, political action committees tPAC's) and a wide range of special 
interest groups. They are characterized by diversity in political interests. 
Community power is exercised within specific social settings and issue areas. 
The power of a political actor may be challenged and is often conceded when 
opponents are successful. Most do not have access to major economic resources. 
Neither do they possess very high levels of social status. 
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The "apolitical stratum," on the other hand, is concerned with civic affairs, 
referring to all events and activities that are considered nonpolitical by pluralist 
standards. This stratum includes the majority of a community's populations. 
Homo civicus generally confines his (or her) activities to the private sector and is 
an active participant in the family, church, school and nonpolitical associations 
located in the community. Because they may perceive a lack of control over 
political matters, most civic actors are disinterested in politics. The power elite 
tend to Oe unresponsive to their needs. Homo civicus is frequently reluctant to 
mobilize resources for the purpose of increasing his community power. 
Collectively, they may be able to force change and influence leadership structures 
when the need arises. Interaction between the "political" and "apolitical strata" 
may occur, although this tends to be contingent upon situational factors. On the 
whole, however, the political impact of homo civicus is far less than that of homo 
politicus. 
Summary 
In this chapter, alternative theories of community power have been addressed, 
focusing primarily upon elitism and pluralism. Two perspectives on elite 
theory—functionalism and conflict theory—were introduced, as well as a holistic 
approach incorporating elements of both. In addition, typologies of community 
power and leadership structures have been explored, including a discussion of 
different types of leaders identified through the reputational method. Finally, 
an examination of community leaders and their reputations for power among 
various ethnic and racial strata was presented. 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
AND COMMUNITY POWER 
Alternative theories, perspectives and orientations or community power are 
associated with alternative measurement techniques. The method employed is 
irequently a proauct ot one's paradigm, thus designed to identity specific types 
or leaders, inrluentials and power structures iFreeman, Fararo, Bloomberg & 
Sunshine, 1963/. Over the years, different theories and methods have emerged to 
dominate research in community power. Prior to the 1950's the identification of 
leaders was primarily conducted through the positional approach (Mills. 1959). 
Since that time, a variety of methods—including the reputational (Hunter, 1953, 
1963) and decisional (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963, 1980; approaches—have been 
employed by social and political researchers. While the positional and 
reputational methods are generally associated with the functional-elite 
perspective ot community power, the decisional approach is grounded in pluralist 
theory. Each of these methods is discussed in the following sections. Their 
advantages and disadvantages are addressed in Chapter 4. 
Positional Approach 
One means or measuring community power is the positional approach pioneered 
by C. Wright Mills (1959). As suggested above, this method is related to the 
functional-elite perspective. It focuses upon leaders who are highly visible and 
occupy formal positions of authority. One's position in the community may be a 
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composite or a vanetv or roles, speciric runctions associated with this position, 
fie ^or she; may pertorm various roles, especially formal ones, collectively 
constitutinq his <or hen social position iMatras, 1964^. This position, including 
each role, may ennance ms or her capacity to inrluence a wide range of policies 
and decisions. Local leaders are characterized by different roles and positions, 
and thus vary in their abilities to sway and exercise power. 
Through the positional approach, the formal leader may be identified according 
to the number or roles he ^or she; occupies, as well as the social status 
associated with each. The social status or a social role is its social value, which 
detines a leader's position in the community. In this method, incumbent leaders 
are catalogued and listed by social function. Each function is assigned a score 
that corresponds to its social status and value, and thus serves as a measure of 
the level or community decision making (White, 1950;. Because local leaders may 
perrorm a variety or runctions, the scores u.e., social values; of all functions 
associated with each particular leader are added to obtain a composite score, or 
composite value. The leader with the highest score is regarded as the most 
inrluential over major decisions arfecting the community. 
Reoutationai Approach 
The positional method, though connected with the functional-elite perspective 
or community power, rails to address the influence of private actors upon 
decisions made by rormal leaders. In the community, the economic elite 
rrequently manipulate rormal officeholders through covert means. Hunter il953, 
1963; proposes the reputational approach to the study of community power, also 
grounded in runctional-eiite theory. Reputational designs focus upon information 
provided bv a sample or "knowledgeables," informants familiar with the structure 
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and distribution or power, thereby facilitating the identification of covert 
actors.* Inrluentials identified through this method have reputations for 
community power among "knowledgeables." It consists of the following basic 
steps: 
1. A list of informants, consisting of individuals presumed to be familiar with the 
distribution ot power in the community, is constructed. 
L. Each informant, or "knowledgeable," identifies individuals he or she believes to be 
the most influential. They may be asked to place these leaders, or potential leaders, in 
rank oraer. 
Potential power holders identified the most frequently, or those receiving a certain 
minimum number ot nominations, are said to have reputations tor power. 
Each step consists of specific procedures. The first step, the construction of 
a list of "knowledgeables," is accomplished by consulting a variety of sources, 
including individuals and documented material (e.g., journals, newspapers, 
government documents and legal records). They may be identified by soliciting 
the aid of officials from local organizations and referring to organizational 
transcripts. Specifically, some members of chambers of commerce and business 
ie.g., merchant's associations) and political organizations, as well as university 
personnel, may be instrumental in locating them. The media may also have 
information that could prove to be helpful. Within the media, powerful 
individuals who control the flow of such information may be able to arrange 
Although Hunter relies solely on knowledgeable informants, some variations of his 
method include respondents from the community at large. One example is the "extended 
reputational approach" developed by Bonjean U963, 1964), Bonjean and Carter (1965) and 
Bonjean and Olson (1964). For a discussion of their method see Chapter 4, pp. 60-61. 
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meetings oetween the researcher and others who might agree to serve as 
inrormants. 
These "knowiedgeables" tend to socialize with formal decision makers, thus 
are likely to have access to at least some information concerning local actors who 
inrluence their policies and decisions. Because of this, they are regarded as 
reliable informants. "Knowiedgeables" may include political leaders from the 
public sector, such as members of the city council and county commission, as well 
as various social service agencies. Some may be from the private sector, like 
civic leaders with relatively high social statuses. The economic leader who has a 
relatively high economic status and access to a wide range of financial resources 
ke.g., proprietors, managers of local businesses, major landowners, etc.) may also 
serve as an informant. Both sectors may include organizational leaders, for 
example, educational leaders, university educators and administrators, as well as 
agents of the media. 
By definition, "knowiedgeables" have access to different types of information 
and are familiar with power distributions relating to specific arenas. They are 
selected and classified on this basis. In the reputational method, a list of 
"knowiedgeables" is constructed for a varied number of arenas. This approach 
tends to be effective when a relatively large number of arenas and issue areas 
*Hasab-Elnaby, 1988), as well as "knowiedgeables," is selected. There may be 
several power structures that address different types of issues, or a single 
structure generating community policy and decisions corresponding to every major 
issue. Moreover, an actor may be influential in various areas, thus wield a 
relatively high level of power. In a study of community power in Atlanta, Hunter 
<1953) focused on actors who were influential in the civic, political and economic 
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^business; sectors, as well as those characterized by relatively high social 
statuses. 
Having constructed a list of "knowledgeables" for each arena, its size is 
reduced to facilitate the identification of influentials. In determining which 
"knowledgeables" are to be listed, the researcher must be selective. He (or she) 
may randomly select from the initial list, but generally it is presented to the 
first individuals listed, who are instructed to name a specific number of actors 
believed to be influential within the arena. 
After a reduced list is constructed, it mav then be presented to another group, 
a panel of "judges" who select among the individuals identified earlier. According 
to Hunter, these "knowledgeables" must have resided in the community for a 
number of years so that they are much more likely to be informed than the general 
public. They identify individuals and local organizations that are influential 
within each arena, ranking them according to their perceived levels of influence. 
In the Hunter study, "judges" selected the ten "most influential" individuals 
"from each," as well as organizations who had such power at a more general level 
isee Appendix A). 
During the final phase of the study, the lists are combined into a single 
catalog which is presented to each individual listed. These actors are informants 
who identify influentials with reputations for community power. In addition, they 
respond to a "schedule of questions" concerning their relationships with others 
appearing on the list, a method of determining their knowledge of the distribution 
of power.^ 
^During any phase of this approach, informants may identify individuals not included on 
the original list but who are influential from their perspectives iHunter, 1953). 
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Hunter s method is a general approach to the measurement of community power 
that mav oe moauied according to specific research designs, as well as the 
demands or the researcher. An application of the reputational approach may vary 
rrom study to study, from researcher to researcher. Variation in design may or 
may not produce conflicting results. 
Issue. Event Analysis or Decisional Approach 
Although the reputational method addresses power demonstrated within a 
variety ot arenas during its initial phases, it targets only those influentials with 
reputations for general levels of influence. An alternative to the measurement 
of community power, the decisional approach (also referred to as the issue or 
event analysis method) focuses upon community policy and decision making 
pertaining to specific issues (Bloomberg & Sunshine, 1963; Dahl, 1961). It was 
previously noted that while the reputational approach is associated with the 
runctional-elite perspective, pluralist theory serves as the basis for the 
decisional method. To measure power as defined by this approach, the researcher 
must select among issues and alternative decisions affecting the community. 
Because social issues are characterized by different levels of importance to the 
community and among communities, his or her (research) design must focus on 
those perceived as significant to its residents. In order to determine which 
issues and decisions are important, Polsby (1963, 1980) suggests that the 
following questions need to be addressed. 
1. How many people are affected? 
1. How many different types of resources are distributed? 
3. At what rate are these resources distributed? 
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4. What are the social consequences of the distribution of available resources? What 
changes occur as a result of their distribution? 
In the decisional approach, social issues are classified into (various) 
typologies iBarth & Johnson, 1959). The following general types of issues are 
proposed: ^a) special or general case, (b) local or cosmopolitan emphasis, (c) 
relative impact upon the community, (d) relative impact upon leaders and decision 
makers, and (e) alternative courses of action and inaction. Another typology is 
more speciric and differentiates among these types: (a) government action, (b) 
economic, ic; cultural, (d) medical, (e) business, and (f) intergroup relations. Each 
has a different impact upon community policy and decision making. Economic 
issues include taxation, the generation of revenue. At the community level, 
social welfare issues are frequently components of economic and/or medical 
issues. Those affecting local businesses also include economic issues, as well as 
others concerned with organizational planning, personnel mobility (e.g., 
promotion;, etc. In capitalist society, business organizations function primarily 
in the private sector but may have social connections with actors and agencies 
from the puolic sector (Banfield & Wilson, 1963). The community may be 
heterogeneous and contain a wide variety of groups—including ethnic, racial, 
gender, and religious groups—who are affected by social issues differently. 
They tend to be relatively interactive at the community level but frequently 
compete for resources, a contributing factor in the development of social conflict. 
The decisional approach focuses upon a limited number of issues, as well as 
the decision making process associated with each. Individuals identified through 
this method generate decisions related to specific issues. The basic procedure, 
as developed by pluralists (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1959, 1963, 1980), consists of the 
following steps. 
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1. Select specific issue areas. 
2. For eacn area, construct a list of community leaders ("leadership pool") responsible 
for generating decisions. 
3. For each area, employ the following procedures to identify those decisions that are 
important to community leadens; responsible for making them: interview community 
leaders; attend community meetings <e.g., city council, board of commisioners, local 
organizations, committees, etcj; examine community documents and recoras, including 
organizational transcripts, minutes of "organizational meetings," and journal "accounts."^ 
4. Analyze decisions through information provided by community leaders. 
5. For each area, identify those leaders who are the most influential and have the 
greatest impact upon decision making. A leader's level of influence is measured by his (or 
her> exercise of community power within a particular area. The influential community 
leader tends to exercise a high rate of power, influencing the decision making process in a 
direction that concludes in his (or her) preferential decision. 
Summary 
In this chapter, alternative approaches to the measurement of community 
power, specifically the positional, decisional and reputational methods, have been 
addressed. It was noted that the positional and reputational methods are 
associated with the functional-elite perspective, but that the foundation of the 
decisional approach is pluralist theory, espoused predominantly by political 
scientists. 
^This procedure is briefly described and outlined by Bonjean and Grimes (1974). 
CHAPTER 4 
A CRITIQUE OF THEORIES AND METHODOLOGY 
EMPLOYED IN THE STUDY OF COMMUNITY POWER 
Alternative theories and methods are characterized by certain advantages and 
disadvantages. As briefly noted in Chapter 1, there are a number of specific 
assumptions inherent to each. This is due to the fact that community power is an 
abstract concept which is not only difficult to measure, but define as well. The 
decisional and reputational approaches to its measurement are grounded in 
competing theories, paradigms and perspectives and thus focus upon different 
aspects. Despite certain disadvantages, the reputational method tends to be a 
valid index of the perception of community power if the following condition 
exists: Informants are truly knowledgeable, cooperative and willing to disclose 
the identities of the power elite and other covert actors without hesitation for 
rear or retribution. The employment of reputational measures in contemporary 
studies, with minor modifications to correct deficiencies in the original model, is 
defended in this chapter. 
Criticism of Community Power Theories 
Functional-elite theory. The functional perspective of community power has a 
number of critical assumptions. First, advocates of this theory assume that 
disproportionate power distributions are socially adaptive, promote social 
stability and order and are essential for effective government at the local level. 
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This argument is relatea to claims Ov the power elite that they alone possess the 
expertise ana knowledge required tor community administration. The perception 
ot one's expertise tends to be associated with his or her level ot education. 
Individuals rrom the upper socioeconomic stratum, including the power elite, are 
typically more educated than those rrom the lower classes. Yet, education is not 
a satisfactory measure or expertise. According to Collins *1979), education 
serves as a basis for one s "claim" to certain "occupational positions," not his or 
ner actual abilities ^Matras, 1964, p. 211). In addition, it is a mechanism of 
indoctrinating actors into social roles and behavior patterns characteristic of 
their classes iCollins. 1971, p. 1010; Matras, 1984, p. 211). The power elite are 
also more wealthy than others, a factor which enables them to pursue advanced 
academic "credentials," formal documetation of their educational level and a 
presumption of expertise. Because most members of the lower class live in 
poverty and lack sufficient resources, they are not able to obtain such 
"credentials" (Matras. 1984).^ On these bases, reference to the expertise of the 
power elite rerlects its perception by these actors, not actual abilities. Their 
argument that community government and administration should be the domain of 
the upper socioeconomic stratum appears to lack validity. 
Although access to advanced education contributes to skill development in 
community administration and related arenas, other factors (e.g., personality, 
situational, inherent and environmental factors, etc.) are also important. Racial, 
national and ramily origin, as well as gender, have been employed as criteria for 
^Ithougn. in many contemporary societies, there are a variety of programs designed to 
racilitate access to higher education by the lower classes. Yet, such programs are merely 
methods or legitimating the status quo and the role of education in the development of 
leaders with expert knowledge in community government and its administration. 
51 
community government in the past. In many contemporary societies, including 
democratic ana socialist societies, sucn tactors are still being employed, out this 
generally occurs indirectly through covert means. The perception of an actor s 
quahncation tor political office at the local level may be enhanced through his or 
her social connections with the power elite, members of the same social class. A 
social connection is a network of individuals and groups who share information 
concerning resources ie.g., community power) and their accessibility, an inherent 
consequence of intraclass—or class-based—interaction. Regular patterns of 
interaction tend to occur primarily within social classes.'1' By interacting with 
members of his or her class, the upper class actor develops important 
connections, becoming part of a network that enhances his or her ability to gain 
access to a broad range of resources, including community power. 
According to another assumption of the functional perspective, the power of 
the elite—including the manner in which it is exercised—is legitimate. Although, 
in democratic society, many of these powerholders tend to interpret lower class 
values and ideals as supportive of their power, actors trom the lower classes 
generally do not accept and/or consider such a monopoly as legitimate. This 
assumption may be due to the relatively low rate of participation and visibility in 
the puolic arena ie.g., through the electoral system) by memoers of these strata. 
Yet, on many an occasion they have undertaken measures that encourage the 
redistribution of power at every level of government. 
Functionalists further assume that the distribution of social resources. 
1
 With some exceptions, such as social actors from the business and professional arenas 
who interact with community members from various strata. 
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sanctions ana rewaras in unequal proportions is legitimate. They note that the 
most vaiuaole resources are distnouted to tne power elite oecause these actors 
have a greater asocial/ responsibility than others, perform vital roles in 
community government and presumably possess expert knowledge in its 
administration. In this context, greater access to a wide range of resources is 
regarded as just compensation.^ 
Conflict-elite theory. Conflict theory also nas certain inherent assumptions. 
Advocates of this perspective assume that social conflict is a product of 
ineauahtv, including inequities in the distribution of community power. 
Occasionally, however, groups engaging in conflict and competing for power 
occupy similar status positions. Although eacn may perpetuate the ideal of social 
equality, conflict groups seldom indicate a willingness to share community power. 
They only snare a desire to secure and monopolize it for their own members, 
thereoy excluding all opponents and actors oelonging to others. 
Conflict theorists further assume that inequality is an indicator of repression 
and exploitation. Yet, social inequality tends to occur naturally, frequently 
without human intervention. The limitation of resources, including the resource 
of community power, prevents their distribution in equal proportions. In 
contemporary society, every community has some form and degree of inequality. 
The two general approaches to conflict theory, the critical- and uncritical 
perspectives, are also characterized by certain assumptions. Critical-conflict 
theorists assume that social stratification contributes to instability, conflict. 
■'This Discussion ana criticism focuses upon local level arenas. For global applications and 
emphases of functional theory refer to Clelland (1986), Davis (1948), Davis and Moore 
U945), Matras il964) ana Nanda (1980, 1987). 
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disoraer and unrest in the community. This perspective stresses the importance 
or interclass competition for resources—including community power—m 
furthering class interests but fails to address other relavant factors. The ruling 
class may monopolize power for the benefit of the community. These actors, for 
example, may employ or mobilize it to gain political leverage at higher levels of 
government and obtain the resources (e.g., economic resources) needed for 
community development. 
Critical-conflict theorists also assume that an equitable distribition of 
^community/ power is "possible" ana may occur in the future (Keroo, 1991). It sees 
individuals as being generally "altruistic" and "cooperative." In reality, however, 
they often act to promote their own interests. Cooperation may be merely a 
devise for achieving a variety of personal goals that can not be attained by any 
other means. Even if there is a redistribution of community power, it is 
frequently monopolized by a new group of elites. 
Another assumption of critical-conflict theory is that social instititions, 
including the political and economic institutions, are maladaptive and exploitive 
^erbo. 1991). In the community, as in the larger society, institutions serve to 
maintain social order and continuity. They frequently promote the interests and 
ideology of the ruling elite, but it is these actors who do the exploiting, not the 
institutions themselves. 
According to uncritical-conflict theorists, social conflict is a permanent 
feature of society (Kerbo, 1991), as well as its constituent communities. Yet 
conflicts may be reduced, limited and minimized througn a variety of methods. 
Competing groups may reach a compromise by negotiating the terms of their 
interests. Such an approach is frequently—though not always—affective if 
negotiation is mediated by an impartial third party (e.g., a professional 
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arnirraton. In addition, social contlict mav suoside due to natural occurrences 
resulting rrom contronration oetween opposing forces. A community's economic 
structure may de destaoilized Decause ot their exploits. In an effort to win the 
contlict, tor example, both sides may employ local and organizational (economic) 
resources to the extent that they are virtually exhausted and depleted. Those 
that remain may be inadequate to sustain further conflict and competition. 
Uncritical-conflict theorists further assume that social actors are not capable 
of cooperating in the development of an egalitarian structure (Kerbo, 1991). Yet 
occasionaily thev do cooperate, although only to a limited extent. Specifically, 
interciass cooperation may occur within certain arenas. Members of lower 
socioeconomic strata are perceived as lacking access to a variety of resources but 
frequently do obtain access through indirect means. In contemporary socialist 
and democratic societies, there are a number of social programs through which 
these resources are made relatively accessible. At the community level, for 
example, citizen participation programs are often developed to foster the 
empowerment ot the powerless through incentive and motivation. Although the 
power elite may control the administration of such programs, as well as the 
allocation of community power to a diverse network of groups, actors and strata, 
this aoes not necessarily produce contempt and alienation. Social conflict may be 
minor ana relatively predictable. In addition, a variety of resources, including 
those ot an economic nature, may be provided by philanthropists (Marx & Engels, 
1930, 1963). Even though there may be various personal, self-serving and/or 
class-oased motives for such programs, they tend to contribute to the inhibition 
of social conflict in at least some cases.^ 
Holistic-elite theories. Theoretical approaches that incorporate 
functionalism and the conflict perspective of communiry power may be regarded as 
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improvements (Lenski. 1966; Ossowski, 1956, 1963), but they are also 
characrerized by certain problems. The synthesis of two conflicting views 
frequently results in the precedence of one at the expense of the other. 
According to Dahrendorf (1959), functional and conflict theories address different 
"problems," "complementary" approaches and descriptions of power, yet not 
compatible components of a single theory (Heller, 1987). Each may explain social 
processes in different communities. The functional perspective tends to be 
applicable to communities in which order and stability prevail. Conflict theory, 
on the otner nana, is more approprate for those dominated by disorder and unrest. 
Thus, a holistic approach to community power focuses predominantly upon either 
functional aspects or conflict aspects. 
Pluralist theory. Elite theories are not the only ones subjected to criticism 
for their assumptions. Plurahsts (Dahl, 1961) assume that community power is 
decentralized in the United States. According to this view, power is shared and 
distributed among various actors, organizations, bureaus, agencies and interest 
groups with "veto" power that inhibits unilateral domination and the development 
of power monopolies. It is further assumed that such monopolies do not occur on 
a permanent basis and decisions are made by a number of actors who address 
specific issues. Yet, some actors tend to influence the formulation of policies 
and decisions associated with a wide range of issues. In addition, they may 
occupy social positions for relatively long periods of time. Pluralist theory 
^This discussion and criticism focuses upon local level arenas. For global applications ana 
emphases of conflict theory refer to Collins (1971, 1975, 1979), Dahrendorf (1958, 1959, 
1961, 1967), Kerbo 11991), (Closs il986), Matras (1984), Nanda (1980, 1987), Turner (1991) and 
Wanner (1986). 
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tocuses uoon tormai ieaaership ana visible decision making structures, but fails 
to address the impact or covert actors—local elite or intluentials wielding a 
preponderance ot power and influence in the community. 
According to another assumption of the pluralist perspective, social and 
political participation, diversity and toleration for dissension are encourage in 
American communities. Nonparticipation by individuals (homo civicus) is 
therefore perceived as a personal choice. While such ideals are publicly 
advocated, numerous events attest to the employment of a wide range of 
measures designed to control the extent of participation, an indication ot 
intolerance. Prior to and during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960's, for 
example. Southern political leaders pursued measures that bar African-Americans 
from access to various social structures, including local arenas of leadership. In 
other parts of the United States, attempts at discouraging equal access to 
resources by racial and gender strata have been undertaken as well. 
African-Americans, Hispamcs, the handicapped, unmarried couples, unmarried 
women with children, etc., are frequently denied residence within certain sectors 
of the community. This may occur on either a direct or an indirect basis, such as 
the institution ot high fees or rates which preclude accessibility to actors lacking 
sufficient economic resources. 
Pluralist theory also assumes that every actor commands possession of some 
resources that may be converted to community power. By applying this argument 
only to certain contexts, pluralists focus upon the potential aspects of power, not 
the reality in which merely a few are capable of influencing the most important 
policies and decisions affecting the community. They contend that all individuals 
have potential power, though most choose not to exercise it. Their rationale is 
as follows: All actors nave the capacity to influence policies and decisions made 
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bv tormal leaders, even if they are unsuccessrul or select not to do so for any 
variety of reasons. Realistically, however, many of those who attempt to 
exercise community power are frequently prevented from doing so. In capitalist 
democracies, such as the United States, a number resources, including personal 
and organizational financial assets, are often employed to influence policy and 
decision making. Most actors do not possess extensive access to these 
resources; thus their abilities to influence local leadership are likely limited. 
Another assumption or pluralism is that a majority of the social and economic 
notables in the community tend to be uninfluential in policy and decision making, 
suggesting that they do not wield significantly high levels of power. Most 
plurahsts do not associate economic resources with community power. They do 
not regard access to such resources as a significant factor in its allocation. Yet, 
at the local level there may be various classes of economic notables with variable 
levels of power. Those that command the greatest number of resources may also 
be the most influential over a broad range of policies and decisions, and thus 
wield the highest leveKs) power. Such notables may employ their resources to 
influence not only policies and decisions made by formal leadership structures, 
but other events in the community as well. 
Plurahsts further assume that most political leaders do not have access to 
major economic resources. Yet, many of these leaders frequently receive 
financial support from economic notables to secure and/or preserve their 
interests, a practice designed to guarantee the attainment of common objectives. 
Campaigns for political office tend to be financed as well. 
Finally, the pluralist perspective assumes that community power in the United 
States is exercised by social actors through legitimate means. At least some of 
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them, however, tena to employ illegitimate means ie.g., physical force, coercion, 
etcj to acnieve tneir ends, as narrowly-defined as they may be.5 
Criticism or Community Power Measurement Techniques 
Each method employed in the measurement of community power also has its 
advantages ana disadvantages. The positional approach, for example, is limited 
to studies tocusing on leadersnip based in social institutions (Freeman, Fararo, 
Bloomoerq & Sunsnine. 1971; Hasab-Elnaby, 1988). Researchers using this 
method assume that major policies and decisions are generated by actors who are 
highly visible in the community and occupy formal positions of power (Bonjean & 
Olson, 1964, 1971). Another criticism of the positional approach is that it is 
difficult to compare results from different studies because there is little or no 
intercommunity standard or consensus concerning the application of titles to 
similar positions. Different titles may be employed to describe corresponding 
positions in any number of organizations (White, 1950), including local 
governments and their administrative branches te.g., bureaus, agencies and 
departments;. The participation approach focuses primarily on social 
participation by a variety of actors and organizations in the community, but may 
also be used to identify institutional leadership (Freeman, Fararo, Bloomberg & 
Sunsnine, 1971; Hasab-Elnaby, 1988). 
The two major methods of measurement are employed by researchers with very 
5These criticisms focus upon local level arenas. For global analyses and criticisms refer 
to Connolly (1969;. 
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different views or community power.^ Each perspective focuses upon the 
weaknesses of the otner, therefore methoaological weaknesses are addressed as 
well. Even though the reputationai researcher distinguishes between community 
power and its perception, one's reputation may imply that he or she has the 
ability to exercise it (D'Antonio, Ehrlich & Erickson, 1961; Wolfinger, 1960, 1962). 
Political scientists (Dahl, 1958; Polsby, 1963; Wolfinger, 1960), predominantly 
espousing the pluralist perspective, the view that power is distributed among 
various groups ana factions, argue that the reputationai approach assumes the 
existence of a covert structure consisting of local elite who monopolize power and 
dominate every major policy and decision. Some political sociologists tClark, 
1968; Walton, 1970) also note the inherent assumption of convergent or 
monolithic structures within reputationai designs. Critics emphasize the fact 
that social actors use different approaches when exercising power: While some 
exercise it on a perpetual basis, others refrain from its exercise. Because 
reputationai measures are not concerned with the procedures involved in 
developing local policies and decisions, pluralists contend that they ao not 
explicate political processes related to power. 
Although the reputationai researcher may distinguish among different levels 
of community power, leadership and decision making, including both vertical and 
horizontal levels, his (or her; approach focuses primarily upon the power elite. 
Pluralists argue that power is actually distributed among a variety of actors who 
exercise it within specific domains, each responsible for generating decisions 
6The reputationai and decisional approaches are usea by functional-elite theorists and 
pluralists, respectively. For a discussion of these perspectives refer to pp. 23-26 and 
37-40; and for a critique see pp. 49-52 and 55-56. 
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associated with different issues, a ractor not addressed during (the major phase 
of) the reputationai method iPolsbv, 1963; Wolfinger, 1960). Apparently, some 
sources imply that the use of this approach tends to dislodge institutional 
leadership iFreeman, Fararo, Bloomberg & Sunshine, 1971; Hasab-Elnaby, 1988), 
not the impiementors and executors or their policies. 
Another criticism of the reputationai approach is that informants may not be 
familiar with the distribution or power in the community and the political process 
involved in the development of policies and decisions (Wolfinger, 1960). In some 
reputationai studies, inrormants are from tne private sector and obtained througn 
random sampling. Those who are knowledgeable may be overlooked and not 
included. Most individuals are not acquainted with the structure of power and its 
role in the decision making process (Wolfinger, 1960). According to Wolfinger 
(1960). this is also true when informants are from the public sector and 
themselves wield such responsibility. They may espouse different perspectives 
and definitions of power, thus inaccurately identify individuals as leaders 
iBonjean, 1964; Bonjean & Olson, 1964; Wolfinger, I960).7 In addition, research 
designs may vary among reputationalists, a factor which tends to produce 
conrlicting results. During the analysis of data, there is no apparent standard 
that serves to illustrate the distribution of power in the community. Specifically, 
reputationai studies set different limits defining the number of identifications 
required for individuals to be classified as community leaders (Bonjean & Olson, 
1964, 1971; Clark, 1968; Hasab-Elnaby, 1988). 
Bonjean (1963, 1964), Bonjean and Carter (1965) and Bonjean and Olson (1964) 
including those presumed to be experts in local power distributions. 
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suggest that a comparison or the perceotions or "knowieageaoles" with those at 
the general population is a better method of identifying local leadersmp. They 
have developed an "extended reputational approach" in which the perceptions of 
these two groups of informants are comparea. According to Bonjean and others, 
each group identifies different types of leaders. All informants identify visible 
leaders, but only "knowiedgeables" identify those who are concealed and wield 
most of the power in the community. As informants, "knowiedgeables" tend to be 
much more credible than others; thus their perceptions of community power and 
leadersmp are said to reflect actual distributions. 
The decisional approach is also characterized by certain disadvantages. First, 
it is primarily designed to locate formal officeholders, not community actors who 
influence their decisions. Researchers using this method assume that major 
decisions in the community are made by political leaders with high visibility. 
They fail to reveal the identities of influentials who regularly have an impact 
upon local decision making but whose best interests are served by remaining 
anonymous, namely the power elite (Presthus, 1964). These elite may control 
access to crucial information, including a wude range of recoras, documents and 
transcripts. With their interests protected by formal leaders, access to the 
power elite tends to be difficult. Community decision makers may not trust 
researchers or their motives and thus may not cooperate (Bonjean & Olson, 1964, 
1971;. 
Another criticism is that the number and types of issues addressed by the 
decisional researcher may be inadequate. Different" criteria" are employed in 
their selection, an indication that the decisional approach lacks a uniform and 
acceptable standard. Those that are important to the researcher may not be 
important to local officials and/or the community at large (Bonjean & Olson, 1964; 
Bonjean & Grimes. 1974). Reputationalists also argue that the time factor limits 
the decisional researcher in the study of community power (Bonjean & Grimes, 
1974). The acquisition of information through document analysis and—formal and 
informal—community meetings requires a relatively long period of time. The 
researcner may not be able to attend every scheduled meeting of local 
committees, task groups and organizations. To protect common interests, 
influential groups and powerful actors ;the power elite) may pursue "closed" 
meetings ^Bonjean & Olson. 1964, 1971; L. A. Platt, personal communication, 
1989;. 
Althougn aecisionai and reputationai researchers note the methodological 
deficiencies innerenr to each other s design, they endure common problems. For 
example, both address different facets of community power, with the decisional 
and reputationai approaches focusing upon visible leadership and covert actors 
who are perceived as being powerful and influential, respectively. 
In Defense of Hunter and the Reputationai Approach 
By its very nature, the measurement of community power and its exercise 
generates certain methodological problems. The validity of a researcher's 
technique may be low, in which case his or her conclusions are questionable and 
thus not likely to be very accurate. Although the decisional approach consists of 
objective measures designed to locate visible leaders who exercise power, it does 
not uncover the power elite, covert actors who tend to have an impact upon the 
direction of their policies and decisions. In the community, formal decision 
makers mav be influenced by a variety of private actors with an interest in 
controlling political behavior. The decisional researcher attends formal meetings 
and interviews these leaders, but decisions may actually have been made through 
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intormai consultation with private citizens. Thus a tormai meeting may be merely 
a contirmation or ratification ot decisions maae elsewhere. The power elite may 
provide incentives ^e.g., monetary rewards) to visible leaders that serve to 
secure their power over them and achieve certain ends, in return, their identities 
are protected by these leaders. Decisional techniques are not designed to 
disclose sucn inrluentials, only those who are highly visible in the community iL. 
A. Platt, personal communication, 1989). 
Such problems with validity are not found in the reputational method because 
the focus is upon the perception of power rather than power per se. its exercise 
or the actual levels demonstrated by community actors <e.g., the power elite). 
The reputational researcher depicts these actors according to their social 
statuses among—and identified by—local "knowiedgeables" and/or in the 
community at large. To ascertain an informant's knowledge of the configuration 
of power in the community, he (or she) is asked about his lor her) relationsmp 
with each candidate listed on the schedule (Hunter, 1953). As voluntary 
participants in community power studies, they are likely to provide relatively 
accurate inrormation concerning their personal perceptions ot community leaders. 
For this reason the reputational approach is regarded as a valid index of such 
perceptions. In addition, the implementation of this method is relatively simple 
when compared with the decisional approach. It requires less time and expense to 
conduct. Further, reputational designs are easy to replicate, facilitating 
comparison among various communities with similar socio-political, environmental 
ana economic conditions, demography and populations. Within these contexts, the 
continuous use of this approach in contemporary studies of community power is 
justified (L. A. Platt, personal communication, 1989). 
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Summary 
This cnapter nas addressed criticisms and assumptions associated with 
alternative theories and methodological approaches to the measurement of 
community power. The relationship between social perspectives and 
methodologies was Driefly examined. It was noted that the positional and 
reputational apprnacnes are products of the functional-elite paradigm, and that 
the decisionai method has been developed primarily by political scientists 
espousing pluralism. In this chapter, the continuous use of the reputational 
approacn in the study or community power was also defended. This conclusion is 
largely derived from its emphasis upon the perceptions of knowledgeable 
informants rather than oojective observations that fail to explain the impact of 
private citizens. It was argued that community power is an abstract concept 
which is difficult to measure, thus the formulation of decisions is not an 
adequate criterion of measurement, but its perception by local experts familiar 
with the pattern or influence may lead to the disclosure of the identities of—at 
least some—covert actors. 
CHAPTER 5 
A REVISED REPUTATIONAL 
MODEL OF COMMUNITY POWER 
Althougn sociologists have demonstrated that the reputationai approach to 
the measurement of community power is characterized by a relatively high level of 
validity. Hunter's 11953/ method does not identify actors and organizations who 
inriuence policies and decisions maae within specific settings. In this chapter, a 
reputationai model that includes such a measure is proposed. It is also designed 
to locate social units with reputations for community power within a defined set 
or arenas,1 collectively constituting the power elite. As noted in Chapter 1, the 
term social unit is applied to any level of social functioning. It was emphasized 
that these include a wide variety of groups, organizations and individuals, 
reterred to as social actors for the purpose of this thesis. Because they tend to 
exercise community power through a number or different arenas and 
organizations, the model pursues this course. For research purposes, a definea 
set may include every arena and social issue, a majority, series, cluster or 
conglomerate ot issues, or be based on some other standard of significance. The 
issue and arena sets must be relatively large, however.2 j;n t(-,ls thesis, the term 
social arena is used in lieu or social institution. These include the five primary 
^This is oasea—in part—on Bonjean and Olson U964) and D'Antonio and Erickson il962). 
^For a discussion see Hasab-Elnaby (1988). 
65 
insututions laenunea dv socioioQists and amhroeoioqists, the poiiticai. the 
economic isuosistence>. religion, education and the ramiiv ikinshipj, as well as a 
variety or others ^e.g.. social control, law, medicine, etc.;. 
The model tocuses upon a diverse number of variables. It is designed to 
locate Doth social actors ano organizations believed to be powertul torces in the 
community. While some units may have such reputations within a global context, 
those or others may be limited to only certain situations. This distinction 
between qiobal and speciric reputations is important and must be considered when 
assessing tne distribution or community power and leadership. In the community, 
a small number ot actors and organizations may wield power not only at the global 
level, but in a variety or different settings. Collectively, these constitute the 
power elite. By employing the current approach, the researcher will be able to 
depict social units with either or both types of reputations. Specifically, the 
application ot this model is designed to uncover the rollowing: ia; social actors 
with global reputations. (b> organizations with global reputations, <c; social 
actors with reputations within speciric arenas, id) organizations with reputations 
within speciric arenas, le; social actors with reputations within a defined set or 
arenas, and (£) organizations with reputations within a defined set of arenas. 
The current model incorporates some techniques characteristic or the decisional 
approach. Although reputationai procedures are relatively accurate indices of the 
perception of community power (L. A. Platt, personal communication. 1989), a 
rationale ror including decisional techniques is discussed below. The remainder 
or this chapter establishes the foundation ot the proposed model. 
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Rationale for Incorporanng Elements from the Decisionai Approacn 
Ccuauoc iucuiuyiuai» c>oi ii^ch^ucti at iu mc u iuuuxuyi^ai uirxciciiv^co /iciu uAi.±.crcnL 
data ana power distributions, some researcners employ a more inclusive and 
holistic approacn to the measuremenr of community power. The deficiencies 
inherent to reputational and decisionai designs may be corrected by incorporating 
vcertaim aspects of each, facilitating the development of a hybrid approach. Even 
though some researchers may claim to have mastered a complete synthesis of 
these methods, tne probability that they merely borrowed a few elements from 
eacn is mucn more likely. Thus, the reputational and decisionai approaches may 
include common elements. Occasionally, the researcher employing either one also 
uses procedures associated with the other. The reputational method, for 
example, like the decisionai approach, focuses upon specific arenas of leadership 
during its initial stages, although, unlike the decisionai approach, it does not 
consider the irnportance of social issues. Informants name and rank actors 
according to their prestige and status within various sectors. The decisionai 
researcher may also borrow some elements from the reputational approach. 
Personal interviews, for example, may be conaucted to locate and identify actors 
who tend to influence formal leaders. In addition, participants in these studies 
may supply a list ot major issues affecting the community, along with alternative 
decisions related to each (Bonjean & Olson, 1964, 1971). 
Even when there is a complete synthesis, the researcher's design is likely to 
be divided into two parts: one reputational, and the other decisionai. During the 
reputational portion of this method, community leaders are identified by a number 
of informants. The decisionai component, on the other hand, requires the direct 
observation ot political processes related to decision making and different issues 
that are addressed in the community. This may be conducted through a variety of 
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recnmques. sucn as oocument analysis, attenaance at formal meetings, etc.3 in 
many cases, ootn methods are applied to the same community. Data are comparea 
to see wmcn ieaaers round by the researcher are also identifiea by informants. 
The construct; validity of such a design tends to be relatively high if similar 
data are proaucea through the employment of both reputational and decisional 
techniques, resulting in the disclosure of the same leaders and type of 
conrigur a t i c n. 
f U U ^ *4 1 I I IC 1 touci 
Aitndugm the merger or two uiffsrsnt rnBtnOuoiogicS rnay gsncrate rncrs uato 
and remediate criticisms directed at both, in practice this may merely be a means 
or establishing the precedence of one at the expense of the other. Thus a true 
synthesis is not possible. As implied in the preceding section, researchers 
claiming to synthesize the reputational and decisional methods tend to focus upon 
one more than the other. Because it has previously been argued that power per 
se is difficult to measure through objective means, and that its perception is a 
relatively valid indicator or one important facet (L. A. Platt, personal 
communication, 1989), this chapter centers primarily on the reputational. 
However, in oraer to provide a correction of its shortcommings, the proposed 
model incorporates aspects of both methods. Specifically, it includes not only a 
global or general measure of community power, but a variety of others that focus 
upon policy and decision making related to specific arenas. Yet the reputational 
3For a discussion or the reputational and decisional approaches see Chapter 3, pp. 42-48. 
See also Dahl (1961;, Hunter (1953, 1963), Polsby (1959, 1963, 1980) and Bonjean and Grimes 
11974). 
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component or the model is the dominant force. In addition, a distinction is also 
made between the power swayed by social actors and local organizations. Thus 
there are separate measures tor both individuals and organizations 
demonstrating variable levels or global power, as well as within specific policy 
arenas. 
The model consists of three phases. The first is a preliminary stage during 
which important or influential arenas of decision making are identified and 
targeted tor investigation. The power of a social unit tends to be associated 
with its inrluence over issues within a particular arena, some regarded as being 
more important to the community than others. Important arenas are those in 
which powerful actors and organizations are found. In different communities, 
eacn tends to exhibit varying degrees of importance. Thus one arena may be very 
important in some communities, moderately important in others, and vet not at all 
in still others. During the second phase, social units are identified according to 
their power and influence within both global and specific contexts. The global 
level of community power is measured independently of its exercise in different 
settings. That is, the process of identification is an independent operation in 
which global power is assessed without any consideration of its impact upon 
social issues. This model is also adapted to include a variety of arena-based 
measures that serve to locate influential units who tend to matters related to 
each issue. Any particular unit may be powerful within a number of different 
arenas. Vet, the relationship between its effects in one and that in another is 
not adaressed during this stage. Neither is it designed to measure the impact of 
one's arena-based power upon his lor her; global power, or vice versa. The third 
phase, however, does pursue such a course. Basically, it focuses upon the 
relationship between global levels of community power and its exercise within 
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speciric settings. A unit with glooai power mav be able to influence poncv and 
decision making in a variety or arenas. One who has arena-basea power may also 
be influential at the global level. In addition, some units mav affect the 
outcomes or several issue areas ;see Figure 4). Those with global reputations 
for community power, as well as within a defined set of arenas, are the power 
elite. 
Phase I. The first stage of this model consists of several steps. The basic 
procedure is as follows: 
1. A list of informants, consisting of local actors familiar with the pattern 
and distribution or community power, is constructed. 
2. Select issues that are important to the community at large (its general 
population), as well as constituent populations such as ethnic, racial, religious, 
occupational, gender, etc.. groups. 
3. Next, informants identify the policy arena that is associated with each 
issue. They name those which are the most important and influential in the 
community. In addition, they are instructed to place them in rank order of 
importance. 
4. The tabulation of data. Every arena is assigned a numerical score based 
on the trequency of identifications (by informants), a reflection of its importance 
as perceived in the community. 
5. Social arenas identified the most frequently, or those receiving a certain 
minimum number of nominations, are said to be influential and powerful. 
Each step consists of specific procedures. The first step, the construction of 
a list of informants, is accomplished by consulting a wide variety of sources, 
including documented material (e.g., journals, newspapers, government documents 
and legal records) and knowledgeable members of the community. They may be 
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Figure 4. The inter-arena impact or community power and its relationship to 
glooal power. 
identified through the aid of officials from local organizations and by referring to 
organizational transcripts, minutes of organizational meetings, etc. Specifically, 
some members of chambers of commerce and business (e.g., merchant associations) 
ana political organizations, as well as university personnel, may be instrumental 
in locating them. The meaia may also be an important source of information. 
In the community, reliable informants are likely to interact with formal 
decision makers, and may thus have access to information concerning local actors 
who tend to influence their policies and decisions. Some may be political leaders 
within the public sectors, such as members of the city council and county 
commission, as well as any number of social service agencies. Other informants 
may be from the private sector, like civic leaders with relatively high social 
statuses, and economic leaoers wno have relatively high economic statuses and 
access to a broaa range of financial resources (e.g., bankers, proprietors, 
managers or local businesses, major land-owners, etc.). Both sectors may include 
organizational leaders, university educators, administrators and other 
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educational leaaers. as well as agenrs or the media. To ensure that the sample of 
informants is a cross section of the community's population, it is necessary to 
include members or different ethnic, racial, religious, occupational and gender 
groups. In addition, the sample must be representative of a wide range of 
political orientations, as well as socioeconomic and educational backgrounds.4 
Next, social issues are selected and classified into typologies. These are 
placed into two general classes or categories: (a) primary issues, and (b) 
secondary issues. One that is primary is concerned with either political or 
economic matters, in any given group or organization, the pattern of behavior 
revolves arouna political and economic relationships. Political and economic 
issues thereby affect all others wmch are secondary. These include business, 
educational, cultural, religious, security (e.g., social control), legal, medical, 
welfare, and internal relatioms; issues. Each is associated with a particular 
arena in which policies and decisions are made. The procedures involved in the 
making of sucn policies and decisions largely depend on the type of issue 
addressed, the way it is perceived by local residents who are affected by the 
outcome, and special circumstances that demand either a delayed or immediate 
resolution. Issues of an economic nature include taxation, the generation of 
revenue. At tne community level, social welfare issues are frequently 
components or economic, medical and/or health-related issues. Those affecting 
local businesses also include economic issues, as well as others concerned with 
organizational planning and personnel mobility (e.g., promotion), etc. In capitalist 
society, business organizations function within the private sector but may have 
(social) connections with a network of actors and agencies from the public sector 
4This stage is based—in part—on Hunter (1953). 
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iBanneid & Wilson. 1963). This frequently enables them to obtain economic 
resources ie.g., subsidies; from various levels of government. However, they may 
become financially dependent as a result. On many an occasion, their benefactors 
will—either directly or indirectly—demand the return of a favor. Elected 
leaders, for example, tend to solicit support from local businesses during 
campaigns for political office. By virtue of their dependence, businessmen are 
likely to become committed to the goals and causes of certain government 
officials. Examples of legal issues are civil rights and affirmative action issues. 
The community may contain an assortment of social groups, including ethnic, 
racial, religious, occupational and gender groups, each of which may wield a 
different level of influence in regard to some issue. They tend to be relatively 
interactive at the community level but frequently compete for resources, a factor 
which may produce conflict. 
Because it is not always possible for any researcher to approach the study of 
community power from a perspective intent on encompassing every existing issue, 
he lor she) must be selective. They must be chosen according to their importance 
to the people in the community. Although this design focuses primarily upon 
relatively important issues, it may also incorporate those of little or 
considerably less significance. Such an issue (or event), especially if it has not 
received much attention in the media, is referred to as a "nomssue" by many 
social and political analysts.5 The significance of any issue is relative to the 
significance of all others. To a wide variety of local actors and groups, some are 
very important and thus become the targets of their interests. That is, they are 
selective and likely to direct their energies towards a limited few. When 
^For a discussion of "nonissues" refer to Polsby (1980). 
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addressing a number of issues, thev tend to conceive of them in terms of priority. 
Among different groups and actors, some are more important than others. The 
most significant ones, those that serve the interests of a cross-section of the 
community, its general population and constituent groups, must therefore be 
selected for investigation. In order to promote this process, however, the pool of 
, i.. ) ~ / T r  u « noov iOOUC O I If UO L L»C ICiQLlVCl/ IGM^C VllQOQU L- II IQU X » L / W / i 
The process Ot iSSuc ScIcCtiun 13 facilitateu by ccnsuitiny a Wide VaTicty uf 
sources, including social actors and documented material (e.g., journals, 
i   i A^, ;    .^u I tc OM OMC I Of yuvci IMMCMi. U UUU H I C C I LO ai>U IC^ai I CL.UI • OO 11 I1.UI tliaiflO, OUOI I 
aCtur5 iucntity tnuSc i33uc3 tucV pcrCSiVcu tu be the .TiOSt important tO pcuplc in 
tuc comiTiLinity■ Thsy ©re instructcu to pides them in rank ordsr of importance. 
Officials trom local orQ^niZations auu organizational transcripts ars instrumental 
in identifying issues that are important to the community at large, as well as 
specific populations such as ethnic, racial, religious, occupational, gender, etc. 
groups. In particular, business (e.g., merchant associations), political and civic 
organizations, university personnel and members of chambers of commerce may be 
helpful. Another source of information is the media, including the printed (e.g., 
local newspapers) and electronic (e.g., radio, television) media. Finally, the 
researcher may conduct survey(s) to identify issues that are important to the 
community and its constituent populations. 
During the next phase of the study, informants specify those arenas in which 
policies and decisions are made relative to the issues selected above. In the 
community, there are a variety of such arenas, including the political, the 
economic (business), the educational, the religious, the legal, the medical and the 
law enforcement (social control) arenas. Each tends to have a different impact 
upon the community in general, as well as its constituent populations (e.g., 
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ethnic, racial, religious, occupational ana genaer groups). Informants indicate 
which arenas; they believe are the most influential and are instructed to place 
them in rank order of importance. Those identified by the greatest number are 
acceptea as being perceptually significant to the decision making process in the 
community isee Appendix B). 
Phase II. After policy arenas have been identified, the remainder of the model 
focuses upon the identification of social units with reputations for community 
power. This consists of the following steps: 
1. The list of informants is divided into several smaller listings, one 
consisting of those familiar with the general distribution of power (general 
informants;, and a variety of others focusing upon policy arenas that address 
specific issues (special informants). In order to ensure that the values of 
nominations are comparable across arenas, the same number of informants must 
be used for each. 
2. Construct a catalog of every social unit known to have been prominent and 
influential in community affairs during a specified period of time (e.g., the 
preceding five years). 
3. Each informant, or "knowledgeable," indicates which units he or she 
believes are the most influential in the community; further, they are instructed 
to place them in rank order; while general informants identify units perceived to 
be the most influential over a broad range of issues, special informants name 
those perceived to be the most influential over decisions made in regard to 
specific ones. 
4. The tabulation of data. Data provided by general and special informants 
are calculated independently. Every unit is assigned several numerical scares 
based on the number of identifications (by informants), a reflection of its 
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reputation tor communitv power; one score is a measure of influence within a 
global context, and all others apply to specific arenas. 
5. Social units identified the most frequently by general informants, or those 
receiving a certain minimum number of nominations, are said to possess global 
reputations for power. Focusing upon specific arenas, units identified the most 
frequently by special informants, or those receiving a certain minimum number of 
nominations, are said to have reputations for community power within that arena. 
These steps also consist of specific procedures, which are outlined in the 
rollowing discussion. First, the list of informants is divided into several smaller 
listings. One is composed of general informants, those who possess a broad 
range of knowledge concerning local leadership and its activities in different 
spheres of government. Every other list contains the names of special 
informants who are familiar with decisions related to specific issues and 
formulated within a particular arena. There may be a number of power structures 
in the community that address various issue areas (Agger & Ostrom, 1956; 
Polsoy, 1980), or a single structure generating policies and decisions associated 
with each (Bonjean & Olson, 1964). In addition, a small minority of actors may be 
influential in several areas, thus wield a relatively high level of power. 
The next phase of this approach, the development of a catalog of social units, 
consists of two steps. First, a list of every prominent and/or influential unit is 
constructed, regardless of size. This is referred to as the primary catalog, which 
is further divided into two constituent listings containing the names of 
individuals and organizations, respectively. This stage of the model is 
accomplished by consulting the sources noted in Phase 1. 
The identification of influential units also involves two steps. First, 
informants name individuals who, from their perspectives, are the most powerful 
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in the community. Further, they are instructed to place these leaders, or 
potential leaders, in rank order. While general informants specify which actors 
they oelieve are the most persuasive over a broad range of issues, special 
informants name those with the greatest influence over decisions related to 
specific ones. Next, informants identify prominent and influential organizations; 
they are instructed to place them in rank order as well. General informants 
indicate which organizations are influential in regard to different issues 
affecting the community; special informants, on the other hand, name only those 
who wield most of the power over decisions made in regard to specific ones (see 
Appendices C and D for interview schedules). 
The data provided by the sample of informants are classified into several 
categories, depending upon the number of issues involved in the study. They are 
as follows: (a) social actors with global reputations for community power, (b) 
organizations with global reputations for community power, (c) social actors with 
reputations for community power within arena #1, (d) social actors with 
reputations for community power within arena #2 + , (e) organizations with 
reputations tor community power within arena #1, (f) organizations with 
reputations for community power within arena #2 + , etc. Within each category, 
social units are assigned numerical scores based on the number of identifications, 
a reflection of their perceived levels of power and influence. The unit with the 
highest score, thus identified by a relatively large number of informants, has a 
reputation for community power within that category. 
Phase III. After social units with global reputations for community power 
have been identified, as well as every unit with focused reputations, the data are 
analyzed to locate those who have the potential capacity to influence policy and 
decision making within a defined set of issue areas. As noted in the beginning of 
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this cnapter. urns mav include every arena and social issue, a majority, series, 
cluster or conglomerate or issues, or oe based on some other standard or 
signmcance. In the community, as in the larger society, a decision atrecting the 
outcome or a particular issue may also have an impact upon a variety ot others. 
Because they are generally the domain ot social units responsible tor policies and 
decisions made within specitic settings, a relationship between and among 
ditterent sectors is also said to occur. Thus the community is governed by an 
"interlocking network" of arenas iH. M. Kaplan, personal communication. 1993). 
Cleariy, units trom ditterent sectors tend to interact with one another. Political 
groups, actors and organizations, tor example, more or less interact with those 
operating primarily in the economic sphere, and vice versa. When addressing 
ditterent issues, the researcher must be aware of such relationships. The exact 
nature ana pattern ot these relations tends to be relatively unpredictable, 
however. 
By Focusing on a defined set ot issue areas and arenas, the model 
compensates for its isolated view in Phase 2. Within any given set, a unit may 
wield a different level of influence over each arena. Its reputation may oe higher 
in some than in others, which affects the overall power to influence decision 
making within the set as a whole. This is measured by comparing the arena-based 
nominations from the second phase of this approach. A unit's reputation is 
higher in arenas for wmch it (or he/she) has received the greatest number of 
nominations. Collectively, all those with reputations for community power within 
both global and specific contexts, when the perceived level of influence is within 
a significant number ot arenas, constitute the power elite. This is expressed in 
conceptual terms by the following schema: 
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RI1 + Rh + ftln = RI7 
 m— 
RI-j, + RG = RP 
RI = Reputation tor community power within a soeciric social arena and issue 
area 
RIj = Reputation ror community power within social arena #i 
RI^ = Reputation ror community power within social arena #2 
RIn = Reputation tor community power within a speciric arena when the 
research design tocuses upon more tnan two 
RI^ = The mean reputation ror community power within a cluster or 
conqlomerate or issue areas 
NI = The total number or issue areas constituting a research design 
RG = The global reputation ror community power 
RP = The total reputation for community power based on the calculation of a 
global reputation plus mean reputations within a cluster of social arenas 
Prospect rdr the Model in the Study of Community Power 
By applying the proposed model to the study or community power, the 
researcher will be able to depict distributions in a way that other approaches 
have failed to do. Neither the decisional nor (traditional; reputational0 methods 
adequately address and attend to the task or policy and decision making as it 
occurs within speciric arenas. Neither recognizes the need to isolate them ror 
research purposes. Although decisional studies may discuss the roles of social 
actors from a variety of arenas, they oo so only within the context of social 
0As developed bv Hunter il953, 1963). See Chapter 3, pp. 42-46, for a discussion of his 
approach, and Chapter 4, pp. 59-63, for a critique. 
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issues. This approach does acknowledge, however, though indirectly, that actors 
rrom several sectors may inrluence the formulation of policies and decisions 
relatea to a particular issue, implying that they are socially interactive. Yet, it 
is not concernea with the mutual impact they nave on each other. Some actors may 
be relatively charismatic and/or articulate, a factor which makes it possible for 
them to foster a change in the perspectives and opinions of their associates. In 
many communities, leaders address series of interrelated issues. One may have a 
great deal or power over certain issues and very little over another, while the 
opposite may be true ror a colleague. Some tend to swav more influence among 
rormal decision makers than others and thus are much more likely to affect the 
policies and decisions they make. Another group of actors, though generally 
constituting a small minority, may be influential over a broad spectrum of policy 
and decision making. The model presented in this chapter is designed to locate 
such actors ana organizations with varying degrees of power and influence. It 
examines relatively large sets of issue areas, which is neither a requirement nor 
reature ot the aecisional approach. Most decisional researchers investigate only 
a small sample ot issues, thus provide an incomplete picture of community 
leadership. In addition, the proposed model focuses upon social arenas in which 
such issues are addressed, as well as the identification of leaders who develop 
policies and decisions within them. Although these actors and groups tend to 
socialize with one another, suggesting that some may have an impact upon a 
variety of arenas, it is likely that they wield different amounts of power and 
influence in eacn. 
Another reason this model serves the interests of students of community 
power is that the author has addressed and remedied the problems of other 
approaches which have been brought to light by a number of critics. Researchers 
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empioving ditrerent metnods tend to assume that the community is governed by a 
specitic type or structure. As discussed in Chapter 4, the decisional and 
^traditional; reputationai approaches have been criticized for being skewed and 
uncovering either pluralist or monolithic contigurations, respectively. This may 
be aue to any variety of problems associated with, and generating from, research 
design. For example, interview schedules frequently consist of questions that 
may lead informants to respond in a particular direction. The manner in which a 
question is phrased is important if the measure is to be valid. To some 
inrormants, certain items mav be perceived as potentially offensive. This is 
illustrated bv one example found in a schedule employed by Thometz (1963) in her 
study or leadership in Dallas. The first question is preceded by the following 
declaration: "Some people say there is a 'crowd' of men here in the city of Dallas 
that pretty well makes the important decisions about the community."^ This 
statement assumes that the researcher has already concluded the that there is a 
monolithic structure, an unequal distribition of power and little or no 
participation by local residents. Some informants may find this assumption 
offensive. Rapport between informant and researcher is often jeopardized when 
this occurs. He (or she; may even become suspicious of the researcher, especially 
his lor her; motives. These actors may suspect that the purpose of the study and 
interviews is something other than that stated. For example, they mav come to 
believe that the researcher's inquiry into local affairs is part of a covert 
investigation bv either a higher level of government or some other agencv with 
^iiee Thometz, C. E. (1963). Phase I: Community leadership study schedule I. Appendix B: 
Schedules used for collecting and tabulating data. The decision-makers: The power 
structure of Dallas ip. 115). Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press. 
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selr-serving interests in the community. In the mind at the informant, such 
suspicions are frequently justified and confirmed through his or her contact with 
others wno nave oeen interviewed. Informants may react in any number ot wavs. 
Some may retuse to respond to objectionable questions and/or terminate the 
interview. Others may deliberately supply false, misleading and erroneous data 
and identify leaders who actually wield little or no power. In the current model, 
steps have been undertaken to amend the reputational method and offset, 
remediate or compensate tor these problems. The schedules in Appendices C and 
D include components that address government not only by the elite, but also bv 
networks ot groups, actors and organizations who share power in relatively equal 
proportions. Questions are phrased in a way that eliminates assumptions 
associated with other approaches and allows the disclosure of either type of 
structure. 
Summary 
This chapter nas rocused upon a reputational approach to the study of 
community power that differentiates between global and arena-based 
perceptions, as well as the reputation for power within a defined set of arenas. 
Through this model, a variety of policy and decision making bodies may be 
identified. In addition, social units with both global and limited reputations are 
targeted. Within each category, individuals and organizations are measured 
separately. Some techniques employed by political scientists and decisional 
researcners are incorporated into this approach, a corrective measure that 
remediates—in part—their criticisms. 
CHAPTER 6 
IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
This thesis has focusea upon the development or an approach to the 
measurement or community power that covers a broad spectrum ot criteria 
employed by researchers with cutterent orientations. As suggested in Chapter 1 
and throughout this thesis, their perspectives are manifest within alternative 
dennitions ot power. From the discussion in the preceding chapter it is apparent 
that the model s roundation is the reputational method, although with some 
modincation. Basically, it has been refined to make it more applicable to a wide 
range ot units or analyses. A description ot the model is as follows. First, it 
measures the perception of community power within a global context. At this 
level, local leaders tend to interact with actors trom a variety of arenas. 
Because or this, they may directly or indirectly address different types of 
issues. The model takes this into consideration. That is. it includes a component 
that rocuses on one's capacity to inrluence policy and decision making within 
dirrerent arenas, thereby affecting the outcomes or a wide range or issues. 
Although both approaches are used separately, they are also combined to provide 
a third instrument by which global reputations are measured, a composite of the 
nrst two. Finally, the model assesses the perception of power over a limited 
number or issues that are resolved bv actors from speciric arenas. 
Although the author has repeatedly emphasized that the proposed model is 
grounded in the reputational approach, its main purpose is to minimize bias when 
measuring community power. With this in mind, the assumptions associated with 
ditterent theories and methods1 are avoided. Unlike the decisional and 
*See Qiapter 4 tor a critique ana discussion or these assumptions. 
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^traaiuonai/ repunationai approaches, the model is not limited to specmc rvpes or 
leadership ana power structure, it shows prererence towards neither elite nor 
Pluralist distributions, but rather permits the disclosure ot either type tound in 
the community. The primary tool or this method is a series ot questions that do 
not draw on such assumptions. Thev are phrased in an inorfensive wav so that 
responses will serve as more valid indicators or the perception of community 
power once methodological problems have been corrected through rigorous testing 
^see Appendices B thru D)/ The interview schedules are designed to facilitate 
ana maintain rapport throughout the process. Thev acknowledge various 
possioiiities. incluaing tormal and visible leadership, the monopoly or power by 
cliques, organizations and independent actors, and the roles of local residents 
and task rorces in the decision making process. In addition, the schedules are 
multiracetea and may be used to identify social units with community power 
contined to specmc contexts, as well as those who have relatively unlimited 
power. 
This variation or the reputational approach is easy to implement and 
replicate. It is a general method that mav be applied to anv community. However, 
because dirrerent communities are characterized by different social, political, 
economic ana demographic conditions, certain modirications may be necessary in 
its design. Uommumties tend to change over time as well. For example, there 
may be increases or decreases in their socioeconomic statuses, h communitvs 
economic status is associated with its level or industrialization and the 
distrioution or wealth among local residents. Its economic structure is largely 
arrected by industrial development and the influx or merchants and businesses. 
^-For tests or validity and reliability refer to pp. 96-97. 
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In many communities, relatively larqe businesses and industries provide 
employment, procure materials and technical equipment trom local merchants, and 
may also pav taxes and "user rees" for a variety ot services.-3 The people hired 
bv these companies are paid wages that are exchanged tor goods and services and 
used to satisry revenue. These tactors contribute to the community's budget and 
roster economic development, which, in turn, may--directly or 
indirectly—racilitate structural changes in local leadership. Such grounds must 
be important considerations during the selection ot informants. 
The structure ot power may also change as a consequence or social mobility. 
There are two types or mobility, vertical and horizontal. Horizontal mobility 
rerers to the transrer or movement between organizations or an organization's 
components at relatively the same level of skill and power. In the community, 
government employees may transter from one bureau or department to another. 
Vertical mobility, on the other hand, occurs when there is either an increase or 
decrease in an actor s social status, prestige or rank within a particular 
organization or one or its components. In the community, as in society, social 
status is a manirestation or social class. A change in social status is thus 
accompanied by a change in social class. An important byproduct or vertical 
mobility is the transition to another stage or community power. Sociologists also 
apply this concept to the transter or movement between organizations or an 
organization s components at a different level of skill and/or power iW. J. 
-'This is relative to snuational ractors. however. Material and equipment are rrequently 
requisitioned rram central or regional distribution facilities controlled or leased bv the 
company in another community. This is especially true when local merchants are not able 
to meet the needs and demands of the organization and the specirications it has outlined. 
There may also be lower tax rates and service fees or exemptions to attract prospective 
businesses and industries to the community. 
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Strickland, personal communication. 1993;. This is exemphned bv the community 
decision maker who moves to a higher ranking position in another local 
department. Ir an employee had the power to make certain decisions in his or her 
rormer department varena-basea power;, he or she may not have such power in his 
or her current department. When there is a high rate or mobility in the 
community, the structure or power tends to change. The reputational researcher 
must take this into consideration during the selection of inrormants. 
In addition, any change in the composition or a community's population needs 
to serve as a basis tor selecting tnem. This is because the constituents or class, 
ethnic, gender and religious groups may increase or decrease m number due to a 
variety or ractors. including immigration, emmigration and birth and death rates. 
When there is a signincant change in the ratio or social actors identifying with a 
particular class, it is said that the community has undergone a transition in its 
class structure. Related to this, the number of different occupations, 
proressions and educational levels which are represented may also experience 
some transrormation. Finally, the distribution or ethnic groups and religious 
artihations round in the community, as well as male to female ratio, are also 
subject to change. 
Another important factor that must be considered is the influence of actors 
and organizations rrom different sectors. For the purpose or this thesis, a 
sector is denned as a network or group or relatively interactive neighborhoods or 
businesses. Some or these divisions may be more developed than others. 
Community residential patterns tend to be based on wealth and characterized by 
economic segregation, as well as ethnic or racial segregation. Wealthy actors are 
segregated rrom those who are poor, and both are segregated rrom those with 
moderate incomes. In many communities, residents also tend to live in sectors 
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which house others with similar or common social, ethnic, racial, cultural, 
religious, educational, etc. backgrounds ana ties. This may be prescribed by law 
ide jure; or result trom natural circumstances ide racto;. People tend to identity 
with others who have similar backgrounds and, thus, are likely to live in areas 
they inhabit, even ir there are no restrictive residential laws. It must also be 
emphasized that the distribution or males and remales may change m each sector 
or the community, just like it does in society and the community at large. 
When measuring community power, the researcher must be aware ot these 
population concentrations and changes in their compositions. His tor her; design 
needs to be constructed with a particular community in mind. Every pool of 
inrormants must be representative ot a cross section of the community. As noted 
in this section, all social classes, ethnic, religious, professional and occupational 
groups, people with similar educational backgrounds, males, females, etc. should 
□e represented in the study of community power. It was turther stressed that the 
inclusion ot residents rrom each sector is essential. These categories are 
interactive variables. For example, a person may be a highly educated Hispanic 
temale residing in a middle class Roman Catholic neighbornood. The researcher 
must take great care in the construction ot a design to ensure that the sample of 
inrormants accurately represents the social structure or the community. For each 
category, the rate or representation must equal that ot actual distribution. The 
method proposed in this thesis is flexible enough to permit adaptation to any 
number or ractors arrecting different communities at a particular point in time, 
as well as the same community during distinct time trames. 
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Strengths ana Weaknesses 
in oraer ro unaerstana the oroposea model more thoroughly, the reader must 
be aware or its strengths and weaknesses. One major strength is that it targets 
speciric issues and arenas or policy and decision making. That is, the model 
enables the researcher to identify those issues which are important to a 
sigmricant numder or actors in the community. A related strength is that there 
is no limit on the number ot social issues selected tor study. This is an 
improvement over the decisional approach, in which "only a" small sample serves 
as the rocus.^ Further, important and inriuential policy arenas are described or 
delineated through the application ot this model. 
Another strenqtn is that community leaders with reputations tor power within 
specitic settings are identified, as well as those who are influential in a more 
general sense. In addition, two complementary approaches to the measurement of 
global power are undertaken. This is an adaptation to two distinct definitions: 
The nrst tocuses upon the relationship between power and different arenas in 
which it is exercised, and the second ignores this association. Both measures are 
combined to give a more complete picture of the distribution of global power in 
the commumtv. 
The current model also has a few weaknesses. The most important of these is 
its inadequacy in targeting illegitimate sources of power.^ This is particularly 
true when actors operating outside ot the law are powerful on the one hand, yet 
reared on the other. They may be so influential in the community that their 
^Decisionai researchers justity this practice on the basis of "expense" (Polsby, 1963, 
1960;. For a discussion or social icsues and a critigue of the selection process see 
Chapter j, pp. 46-46, and Chapter 4, pp. 59-62. 
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identities are protected Dv rormal pohcv and decision makers, and thus constitute 
a covert structure or power. In tact, it is entirely possible that their identities 
are concealed trom even tormal leaders. Inrormants are trequentlv reluctant to 
provide inrormation that is embarrassing and may serve to incriminate certain 
powerrul parties. The author must emphasize that this results not only trom 
tear, but a sense ot loyalty, obligation and commitment to elites who protect at 
least some ot their interests. In the community, a number ot them may receive 
certain sanctions or rewards in exchange tor their undivided loyalty. These 
actors rnav be given preterential treatment in job market, tor example. Althougn 
survey data is ideally ithough, not always, in reality) held in contidence, the tact 
that thev Delieve their responses will be used in such a way is enough reason for 
retusing to cooperate with the interviewer. Because people who exercise power 
illegitimately have been known to use coercive measures in the past to further 
their interests, it is understandable that many an informant has a fear of 
reprisal for cooperating with research into the community's power network. 
Illegitimate actors may or may not acknowledge claims on the monopoly of 
power, but the tact remains that many of these individuals either generate or 
influence the rormulation ot the most important policies and decisions in the 
community. However, it is very unlikely that each wields the same amount ot 
power. Some may oe more influential than others. A comparison of such actors 
^Although this method is not eguipped to locate actors who exercise power throuqn 
illegitimate means, primarily due to those reasons cited in the text, it is highly 
guestionable whether any moael can. Some researchers may claim that they have developed 
such an approach, but generally it is not possible to include every credible informant who 
is not only ramiliar with the structure of power, but willing to suffer the wrath of the 
power elite. A violation of their trust, confidence and code of secrecy may result in 
severe consequences. 
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mav reveal dirrerences in their aoilmes to exercise power, h tew mav be capaole 
or inrluencinq the development policies ana decisions on a rormal basis, while 
others resort to inrormal persuasion. In addition, they may use either a direct or 
indirect approach when conrrontinq visible leaders. For the purpose of appearing 
legitimate, an illegitimate actor may undertake anv number of steps. For 
example, he \or she) may attempt to enhance his iar her) reputation in the 
community. To do this, the aid of allies and prominent leaders is frequently 
solicited. This is a process referred to as self-leqitimacy. 
Illegitimate actors are from both the private and public sectors. Public 
otricials who use illegitimate forms of power are those who go beyond the 
boundaries 01 their respective offices, which may or may not be defined in the 
community's code or political and administrative behavior. Examples of publicans 
who exercise power illegitimately include mayors and police chiefs from some 
communities who have total control or local government and rule it along 
dictatorial lines. There are a variety of cases of such power monpolies occurring 
even in presumably democratic societies. One instance that comes to mind is 
Chicago's former mayor, Richard Daley. Another is Darvl Gates, the ex-Police 
Chief of Los Angeles who has been implicated in human rights violations by civil 
rights organizations and the mass media. While he has publically denied such 
allegations and improprieties associated with his office, his total, unchallenged 
and unquestionable control over the arena of law enforcement has been 
extensively documented in the press during the past few years. Apparently, his 
arena-based power provided him with virtual autonomy in his department and an 
exclusive responsibility for the development and execution of policies and 
decisions applying to the administration of police matters. 
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Various public and private arqanizauons, incluainq a numoer of special 
interests groups, also tend to employ illegitimate forms of community power. In 
the United States, militant and extremist political orqanizations such as the 
American Nazi Party, Arien Nation and the Imperial Knights of the Ku Klux Klan 
rrequentlv resort to physical force and tactics when there is a perceived threat 
to the status quo, the prevalent way of life, or to a variety of other 
organizational interests. This is also the case for family-based organizations 
with both legitimate ana illegitimate business interests in the United States and 
Sicily. Collectively referred to as Cosa Nostra iar the Mafia;, these ramihes 
have invested their resources into various businesses at the local, national and 
international levels. Legitimate business interests are those which operate 
within the boundaries or the law and include investments in the economic market 
and trade organizations. Illegitimate interests, on the other hand, are associated 
with criminal activity, thus in violation of a society's laws and/or social 
standards. In the United States, these include drug trafficking, prostitution, 
etc., areas or Cosa Nostra's business activities. Another interest is gambling, 
which may be classified as either legitimate or illegitimate, depending upon the 
state or community in which it occurs and adherence to formally established 
guidelines. In recent years, the legitimacy of certain business interests of Cosa 
Nostra has become questionable. This is because its families rely on illegitimate 
means—physical force, coercion and intimidation—to protect them. 
Even those organizations that are legitimately recognized trequently employ 
less than legitimate means in their practices. During political campaigns, for 
example, some rormal parties tend to conduct surveys and polls under the 
pretense or scientific research. Pollsters may or may not identify themselves. 
Out many deliberately fail to cite their organizations of affiliation. Either they 
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do nor idennrv them, or otherwise talseiv claim to represent a certain public 
opinion organization mat may or may not exist. Thus, the identity of the political 
party interested in the aata gathered by pollsters is withheld in manv cases. The 
reason cor this may oe associated with a rear of non-compliance or non-response 
to questions focusing upon personal opinions concerning social issues, as well as 
the approval raring or political ngures and candidates. Some people may refuse 
to participate in surveys if they believe the data will be used for self-serving 
purposes bv a particular party. Nevertheless, the tactic of withholding one's 
identity ana/or parry of affiliation must be questioned on ethical grounds. 
Some religious organizations, as well as a variety of non-religious 
organizations with religious foundations (e.g., pro-life groups such as Operation 
Rescue;, also employ illegitimate means to further their interests. There are 
many examples of such groups offered by both the popular and professional press. 
In contemporary literature, the most famous case revolves around a network of 
religious groups that has attempted to criminalize abortion in the United States 
during the I980''a and early 1990's.^ While some of their efforts have been 
legitimate and channelled through sanctioned behavior, such as public 
demonstrations, legal suits in state courts and legislatures, etc., others have 
not. This has occurred primarily because they have been largely unsuccessful in 
changing current laws.7 These groups have frequently resorted to extreme 
0Groups that rocus on the abortion issue and pursue its cnminalization collectively refer 
to themselves as pro-life groups. They are also called anti-choice groups by their 
opponents who favor legalized abortions and the rights of the mother to opt for the 
termination of her pregnancy. 
''Religious groups, nowever, have had minor and temporary success in restricting abortion 
and its funding in some locations. 
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violeni: measures, incluaing the bombing or vandalism or abortion clinics, the 
narrassment or patients, nurses, physicians and other medical personnel, etc. 
They tend to justiry such actions on ideological grounds. Specifically, they argue 
that the medical procedure or abortion is itself a violent act. From their 
perspective, their use of violence is legitimate in that it is a defense against 
other forms of violence, in this case, medical abortion. Despite such rationale, 
most Americans tend to view militant behavior as illegitimate and 
counterproductive. 
Another weakness of the model is that it is not equiped to distinguish 
between the power elite and lower and mid-level personnel who implement their 
policies and decisions. For the purpose of this thesis, lower and mid-level 
personnel are referred to as implementors or executors. Many of these actors 
are themselves responsiole for policy and decision making, but this generally 
occurs within the boundaries established by elites. The model also fails to 
measure perceptual differences among specific populations in the community, 
including social classes, religious groups and ethnic and gender strata. A fourth 
weakness is that there are no prescribed standards and uniform criteria by which 
comparisons among different communities are possible. Without such standards, 
longitudinal studies concerned with the measurement of changes in the 
distribution of power also tend to be difficult. Finally, the model has vet to be 
tested ror reliability. Once tested, it will be considered reliable if findings and 
results may be duplicated by different researchers focusing upon the same 
community, as long as political, economic and socio-demographic conditions 
remain the same. Ways of compensating ror this problem are discussed in the 
rollowing section. 
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Implications tor Research 
Testing tne Model tor Validity anci Reliability 
As suggested above, the model needs to be tested betore it is applied to the 
field. One way or testing the instrument is through a pilot study focusing upon a 
community smaller in size and population than the one selected for investigation. 
Hunter U953) pursued this course in his inquiry into Atlanta's power structure. 
His methodology was tested in Savannah, a much smaller city when compared to 
the metropolis or Atlanta. 
There are mainly two reasons why it is necessary to test the model. First, 
this will ensure the consistency or procedures involved in the administration or 
the instrument. It will enable the researcher to monitor his or her staff of 
interviewers more closely and make sure that each follows prescribed technical 
guidelines. Because Hunter (1953) tested his method in Savannah, he was 
subsequently aole to make appropriate changes in its design before subjecting it 
to Atlanta. For example, in Savannah there were no specific procedures requiring 
consistency among "interviewers" who conducted the survey. Hunter notes that in 
some situations the questionnaires were completed by the informants themselves, 
but in others by the "interviewers" who solicited their verbal responses. 
Another problem he pointed out was the length of his survey. These problems 
were corrected prior to the Atlanta study. 
The second reason tor testing the model is that the researcher will be able to 
identity and correct any problems associated with methodological reliability and 
validity. The important factor is that every inrormant in the pool understands 
the questions asked by the interviewer. They must be phrased clearly and 
relatively simple. 
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To be considerea a valid insrrument. it must De aeterminea that the moael 
measures wnat it purports to measure. Several types or validity are documented 
bv social researchers. The type concerned with in this thesis is face (Phillips, 
1976; Selltiz, Wrightsman & Cook, 1976), content (Kerlinger, 1964) or logical 
(Goode & Hatt, 1952) validity. Face validity is based on the assumption that the 
instrument measures what it is designed to measure. In the measurement of 
community power, the reputation for leadership and arena and issue-based 
perceptions, it is said to have content validity if it appears to measure 
informants' personal beliefs accurately and adequately. To have face validity, 
the interview schedule must also contain a relatively large number of questions.® 
The model proposed in this thesis has such validity. 
There are a variety of techniques through which the reliability of an 
instrument may be tested. One way is the "test/retest" method. Following this 
procedure, the questionaire is presented more than once to the same group of 
informants (Siegel & Hodge, 1968). Bailey (1987), however, notes that there are 
certain problems inherent to the "test/retest" approach. For example, it is not 
equipped to determine if similar responses during each administration actually 
result from the instrument s reliability, or the absence of any perceptual change 
on the part of informants. Neither does this method ascertain beyond a 
reasonable doubt that different replies point to its unreliability. It is entirely 
possible that a participant has changed his or her opinion(s) and perspective(s) 
between sessions. According to Bailey, a test of reliability can only be effective 
O 
when it is capable of measuring such changes. 
0This discussion is based on Bailey (1987) and Selltiz, Wrightsman and Cook (1976), 
^This discussion is based on Bailey (1987). 
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Anotner wav or testing reliability is the "multiple" (Goode & Hatt, 1952) or 
"alternate-rorms" iSelltiz, Wrightsman & Cook, 1976) method. This involves the 
"construction" or two different versions of the same instrument. Each consists 
of the same questions, with the difference being primarily one of language 
structure. That is, every question on one version corresponds to that on the 
other, but is phrased somewhat differently. Both versions of the instrument are 
"administered" to the same informants during a single session.'' If an informant 
responds in a similar direction to the same item on both, then his or her 
comprehension or that item is taken ror granted for research purposes. If a 
signincant numoer or them^ understand the question, then it is considered to be 
reliable. When computing the scores of an entire schedule, instrument reliability 
is high if a satisfactory number comprehend each item. 
A related means of determining reliability is the "split-half method." This 
involves the development of two questions, both phrased a little differently, for 
g 
each item listed on the questionaire schedules. If the informant gives similar 
responses to both questions, then it is assumed that he or she understands what 
is being asked. If a satisfactory number of them offer similar responses, then it 
mav be said that the item is a reliable measure. When computing the scores of 
the entire schedule, instrument reliability is high if a significant number is found 
to comprehend eacri.*u 
The model also needs to prescribe certain standards and uniform criteria by 
which comparisons among different communities are made possible. Samples of 
inrormants must be representative of the community's populations, including its 
i,JThe term siqniticance has certain research implications. One or more statistical tests 
may be required to determine if the number of respondents is significant. 
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qenerai population and a wiae range or social groups and strata. In each, the 
number iov percentage; needs to be high enough to ensure adequate 
representation of a cross-section or local power perceptions. It is especially 
important to involve members or different social classes, religious groups and 
ethnic and gender strata. In addition, people from different occupations and 
educational backgrounds must be taken into consideration. 
Future applications 
Althouqn the primary purpose of this approacn is to enable the researcher to 
locate—both covert ana visible—leaders, social issues important to the 
community, its sectors and specific populations are also identified. After 
identifying these issues, this information may be provided to community leaders 
for the following reasons: (a; to heighten their consciousness and knowledge of 
the needs, concerns and interests of the people living in the community, and (b) to 
encourage them to take this knowledge and use it towards the development and 
implementation or social programs and projects. 
By applying this method to a particular community, the researcner may also be 
able to enhance the knowledge of citizens so that they will become more tamiliar 
with local leadership. That is, it is a tool for teaching them the identities of 
leaders and the role each plays in the administration of community government. 
This is especially important for democratic societies in which participation is 
ideally encouraged and the responsibility for making decisions is distributed 
among a wide range of officials that are either elected by the people, or 
appointed bv those who have been. If local actors are to have an impact upon 
policies, decisions and a variety of other events affecting their lives, they need 
to know their leaders. Only then can any number of social problems arising in the 
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community or one or its sectors oe resolved. Even if thev do not wield and 
exercise power themselves, by being familiar with the leadership structure many 
residents Uhough not all) tend to have a potential capacity for influencing the 
direction of local policies and decisions. At the very least, they may be able to 
persuade others who are more intuential within this circle. In any given 
community or society, the most effective actors are those who have learned to 
manipulate political processes and hold public officials accountable for their 
actions, policies and decisions.* * It is inevitable, however, that a small minority 
ot them oecome experts in the art ot politics. Some are so skilled in developing 
their strategies, tactics and maneuvers that they are able to Dictate the terms of 
the most vital or important policies and decisions. These are the power elite. 
11
 This argument focuses upon the ideal democratic system, not the reality of power as it 
is used by a minority of actors to command resources in the community. In the modern 
world, many societies claiming to have democratic political structures are also controlled 
bv capitalistic economic structures which stress the importance of competition for 
resources. Due to the fact that it takes capital to gain access to other resources, and 
because most actors do not possess such wealth, it is highly unlikely that thev will 
compete successfully. The few who do control a majority of a community s assets, 
however, are frequently able to convert them into power. These actors, collectively 
rererred' to as the power elite, tend to use their capital as leverage in the political arena, 
thus increasing their weights and influence among formal leaders responsible for a wide 
variety of policies and decisions. 
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APPENDIX n 
Hunter s "Instructions" to "Judges" 
"Place in rank order, one chrouqn ten, ten persons rrom each list or 
personnel-who in vour opinion are the most influential persons in the tield 
designated-inriuential rrom the point or view or ability to lead others." 
From Hunter F 11953;. Appendix: Methods or studv. Community power structure: A 
-r-ny nt ripri^nn makers (P. z65;. Chapel Hill: The University or North Carolina Press. 
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APPEHBIA B 
ScheauIe or Questions ror Identifying Social Issues 
and Arenas of Policy and Decision Making 
Part I: Social Issues 
In vour opinion, wmcn issues would vou sav are the most important to the 
people or [communuv name]? 
Amonq tnese issues, are there any particular ones that are more important 
than otners? Thar is. do residents talk about them more often than they do 
about others? 
Would vou name them.' 
From vour perspective, rank these issues according to their importance to 
[community namel'S residents? 
Or these, wmch would you say is the most important.' 
in [community name], are there anv groups or people such as ethnic, racial, 
occupational, religious and women s groups who are more concerned about 
some issues than others; 
Name tnese groups and issues. 
Are tnere any issues that are more important to [community name] s 
leaders than to its population? 
Would vou name tnemr 
From vour perspective, rank them according to their importance to 
[community name]'s leaders? 
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U. Concerning tnese issues, wmcri wouia vou sav is the most important to local 
leaoers 
Part II: Policy Arenas 
1. in most communities, there are a variety ot sectors in which people interact 
and policies and decisions are made. For example, there are political, 
educational, legal, medical, religious, business or economic and law 
enrorcement sectors. Would you say that, in [community name], some are 
more important, powerrul and influential than others? That is, do some 
sectors persuaae rormal leaders to give priority to their concerns, issues 
ana interests.' 
i. Would you name them? 
j. From your perspective, rank these sectors according to their importance and 
abilities to intluence [community name] leaders. 
4. Comparing [community nameJ's sectors, which would you say is the most 
important to. and influential or persuasive with, formal leaders.' 
APPENDIX C 
Scheauie of Questions to General Informants 
Part I 
Do vou think that tnere is a group ot people in [commumtv name] that 
monopolizes power, or do you think that policies and decisions are made bv many 
people ? 
Part II 
Interviewer instructions. If respondent believes that policies and decisions 
are intluenced by many people, proceed to Schedule A. If respondent believes 
that community power is monopolized by a group of people, proceed to Schedule B. 
SCHEDULE A 
1. Are these people primarily rormai leaders or concerned citizens? 
i. In [community name], are most rormai leaders elected or appointed? 
3. Is local leadership responsive to the demands or residents? 
4, Do [community's name] leaders frequently encourage participation in the 
decision making process bv residents? For example, do they contact 
citizens for input, conduct polls or surveys, submit tentative decisions to 
local referenda for legitimation and public approval? If so, do these 
leaders employ the data acquired through polls, surveys and referenda as a 
basis tor forming community policy and achieving decisions acceptable to 
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the general public; 
5. Does [cammunuvs nameJ political organization include task torces 
consisting or residents rrom the communitv? If so. to what extent do 
tormai leaders use their proposals in community planning and development? 
Do they provide them with resources to help them in communitv planning and 
development and to attain their goals? 
6. Are some task torces more influential than others? For example, do formal 
leaders act upon proposals submitted by some more than others? 
7. Which task torce(s> would you sav is/are more influential? 
a. Within this/these task rorce^s^, are there some individuals that are more 
influential than others.' 
9. Would you name them? 
SCHEDULE B 
Would you call this group a clique who controls the community, an organization 
or group or organizations with substantial power, or a group of individuals acting 
independently ot organizational ties.' 
Interviewer instructions. If respondent believes that community power is 
monopolized bv a clique or group of individuals operating independently ot 
organizational ties, proceed to Section 1 of this schedule. If respondent believes 
that power is monopolized by one or more formal organizations, proceed to Section 
2. 
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Section 1 
1. Would you name the individuals who you believe wield most of the power in 
[community nameJr 
c. Would vou say that they are cohesive as a group and form a clique that 
influences every policy and decision made by formal leaders.' 
i. From your perspective, rank them according to their levels of power. 
4. In your opinion, which individual would you say is the most influential in 
[community name]? 
5. Would you say that these individuals influence every major policy and 
decision made by formal leaders, or that at least some tend to influence 
primarily the formulation of certain types of policies and decisions? That 
is, do they have more influence over some policies and decisions than 
others? 
6. Name these individuals and the policies and decisions which each 
influences. 
7. Are any ot them members or local organizations? 
6. Would you name them and the organizations; each belongs to? 
9. Do vou believe that they are influential and powerful because of the 
orgamzauomsj they belong to? That is, do they use these organization^ 
to promote their personal aims and influence community leaders? Are 
organizational resources readily available to them for this purpose.'' 
10. Would you then say that there are at least some organizations in 
[community name] through which individuals act and crystalize their power? 
Section 2 
1. Would you name this/these organization(s)? 
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i. From vour perspecuve, rank [community's name] organizations according to 
the power each has in the community? 
3. Ut all the organizations in [community name], which would vou say is the 
most influential ? 
4. Would vou say that this/these orgamzatioms) intluenceis) every major 
policy and decision made by formal leaders, or does it/do they tend to 
inriuence primarily the tormuiation of certain types of policies ana 
decisions? That is. does it/do they nave more influence over some policies 
and decisions than others? 
5. Name these policies and decisions and the orgamzatioms) that intluenceis; 
eacn. 
6. Within this/each organization, which individual(s) would vou say is/are the 
most influential? 
7. Would you name them? 
d. Would you say that they employ their status within prestigious 
organizations to enhance and crvstahze their own power in [community 
name J ? 
9. Finally, would vou say that their power results from membership in 
organizations, or that these organization(s) are influential and have power 
in [community name] because some of their members are powerful and 
influential?^ 
1 This question is based on aiternative theories or indmauai and organizational power. 
For a aiscussion, see Appleton. L. M. (1983). Corporate and personal action in community 
decision-maKing (Doctoral dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1982). Dissertation 
Abstracts international, 43, 3710A. 
The questions in this schedule are—in part—based on those developed bv Thometz, C. E. 
(1963k Appendix B: Schedules used for collecting and tabulating data. Ihe 
riecision-makers: The power structure of Dallas (pp.113-117). Dallas: Southern Methodist 
University Press. 
APPENDIX D 
Schedule ot Questions to Special Informants 
Part I 
Do you think that there is a group of people who makes, develops and/or 
influences most of the Carena name] policies and decisions in [community name], 
or do vou think that these policies and decisions are influenced bv many people? 
Part II 
Interviewer instructions. If respondent believes that [arena name] policies 
and decisions are influenced by many people, proceed to Schedule A. If 
respondent believes that there is a specific group of people who influences a 
majority ot these policies and decisions, proceed to Schedule B. 
SCHEDULE A 
1. Are these people primarily formal leaders or concerned citizens? 
2. In [community name], are most formal leaders who address the [issue 
name] issue elected or appointed? 
3. In reference to the [issue name] issue, do these leaders respond to the 
demands and interests of residents? 
4. Do they frequently encourage participation in [arena name] decision making 
by residents? For example, do they contact citizens for input, conduct polls 
or surveys, submit tentative decisions to local referenda for legitimation 
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and pudIic approval? Ir so, do tnev emplov cne data acquired through these 
polls, surveys and referenda as a basis tor forming [arena name] policy ana 
achieving decisions acceptable to the general public; 
5. Does [community's name] political organization include a task force that 
consists or residents from the community and addresses [arena name] 
issues? If so. to what extent do formal leaders use its proposals in [arena 
name] planning and development? Do they provide this tash force with local 
resources to help them in [arena name] planning and development and to 
attain their goals.' 
o. Within the [arena/issue name] task force, are there some individuals that 
are more intluential than others? 
7. Would you name them? 
SCHEDULE B 
Would you call this group a clique who controls local [arena/issue name] 
policy and decision making, an organization or group of organizations with 
substantial influence and power over the [issue name] issue, or a group ot 
individuals acting independently of organizational ties? 
Interviewer instructions. If respondent believes that local [arena name] 
policies and decisions are made by a clique or group of individuals operating 
independently of organizational ties, proceed to Section 1 of this schedule. If 
respondent believes that these policies and decicions are influenced by one or 
more tormal organizations, proceed to Section 2. 
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Section 1 
1. Would you name chose individuals who you believe are the most influential 
over Carena name] policies and decisions made in [community name]? 
2. Taken togetner, would you say that they are a clique? That is, are they a 
cohesive group with [arena/issue name] interests and so use their power to 
inrluence [arena name] policies and decisions that protect, promote and 
rurther these interests? 
3. From your perspective, rank these individuals according to their abilities to 
inrluence [arena name] policies and decisions. 
4. In your opinion, which individual would you say is the most influential in 
determining [issue name] policy in [community name]? 
5. Are any of these individuals members of local organizations that address 
[issue name] issues? 
6. Would you name these individuals along with the organizatioms) each 
belongs to? 
7. Do vou believe that they are influential over [arena name] policies and 
decisions oecause of the organizatioms; they belong to? That is, do they 
use local organizatioms) to promote [arena/issue name] interests and 
secure power to influence [issue name] policies and decisions made by 
formal leaders? Are organizational resources readily available for this 
purpose ? 
o. Would you then say that there are at least some organizations through 
which individuals crvstalize their power over [arena name] policies and 
decisions in [community name]? 
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Section 2 
1. Would vou name this/these organizatiorus;? 
2. From your perspective, rank [community's name] organizations according to 
their abilities to influence Carena name] policies and decisions in 
[community name]? 
3. Of all the organizations in [community name], which would you say is the 
most influential over [arena name] policies and decisions? 
4. In each organization, which inaividual(s) would you say is/are the most 
influential over local [arena name] policies and decisions? 
5. Would vou name them? 
b. Would you say that they employ their status in prestigious organizations to 
influence [arena name] policies and decisions in [community name]? 
7. Finally, would you say that they are influential over [arena name] policies 
and decisions in [community name] because of the organization^ they 
belong to, or that this/these organization(s) is/are able to influence [arena 
name] policies and decisions because some of its/their members are 
powertul ana influential?^ 
lThis question is partially based on alternative theories of individual and organizational 
power. For a aiscussion. see Appleton, L. M. (1983). Corporate and personal action in 
community decision-making iDoctoral dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1982). 
Dissertation Abstracts International. 43. 3710A. 
The questions in this schedule are—in part—based on those developed by Thometz, C. E. 
11963). Appendix B: Schedules used for collecting and tabulating data. The 
decision-makers: The power structure of Dallas (pp.1 13-117). Dallas: Southern Methodist 
University Press. 
nPPEHDIX E 
Tvpoioay cr Power 
Personal Power Social Power 
teacures 
rocuses upon the seit associated with the 
social environment 
instinctive/impu isive rationa1e/1ogic 
1ow inhid11 i on 
(restraint; level* 
h i gh inh i b i t ion 
(restraint) level* 
Typologies or Social Power 
Bv Social Institution By Social Unit 
Political Power Individual Power 
Economic Power Collective Power 
Organizational Power 
Bv Soaria 1-Tempora1 Factors 
Perpetual Power 
Episodic Power 
•based—in part—on McClelland, D. C. (1975). Power: The inner experience. New York: 
Irvington Pudiisners, Inc. 
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APPENDIX F 
G1ossarv 
actual group a social unit consisting of diverse interactive individuals socially 
identifying with the group. 
actual power-rhe explicit exercise of power which frequently becomes manifest 
through the formulation of social policies and decisions, 
asgociatipn-a social group consisting of individuals with common characteristics, 
bureaucracy-an organizational system characterized by functional specialization 
^''division of labor"), with the "responsibility" for different functions 
distributed among diverse organizational components (divisions; bureaus; 
organs;.1 
citizen-a social actor who is enfranchised to participate in the political and 
economic atfairs of state and has an invested interest in its operations. 
civics-the interactive relationship between the political and economic affairs of 
state. 
civil power-social power manifest through an interactive relationship between 
political power and economic power. 
1
 Based—in part—on Frank, A. W., Lachmann, R., Smith, D. W., Swenson, J. V., Wanner, R., & 
Wells, A. (1986). The encyclopedic dictionary of sociology (3rd ed.). Guilford, Connecticut: 
The Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc.; Robertson, I. *1986). Bureaucracy. In A. W. Frank, R. 
Lachmann, D. W. Smith, J. V. Swenson, R. Wanner, & A. Wells (Eds.), The encyclopedic 
dictionary of sociology (pp. 30-31). Guilford, Connecticut; The Dushkin Publishing Group, 
Inc.; and Weber, M. (1986). In A. W. Frank, R. Lachmann, D. W. Smith, J. V. Swenson, R. 
Wanner, & A. Wells (Eds.), The encyclopedic dictionary of sociology (p. 30). Guilford, 
Connecticut: The Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc. 
127 
128 
coalmon-a network \union; consisting or diverse interactive social units, 
including individuals ana social groups. 
collective power-a rorm or social power exercised bv social actors as members or 
a social group. 
corporation-an organizational system consisting or components—including 
individual memoers and organs idmsionsj—that socially identity with the 
organization as a conesive social unit. 
corporatism-the conesive lor soiidaristic; social laentitication with an 
organizational structure. 
crowa-an aggregate or inaividuais united by chance in a particular space and at a 
particular time/ 
economic institution-a social instutution that legitimates economic power and the 
prevalent mode or accessing and distributing social resources, including 
economic resources. 
economic power-the capacity to control social resources, including economic 
resources. 
education-the communication or social knowledge and inrormation within society, 
including traditions, customs, norms or social interaction, and behavior 
patterns. 
educational institution-a mechanism or socialization, enculturation, cultural 
continuity, social equiibrium and social control. 
-rtccorainq to LeBon il697, 1987), a crowd is an aggregate or individuals who are 
stimulated towaras collective action through the convergence or combination or instincts 
that produces a collective consciousness, rererred to as the "mental unity of the crowd." 
Apparently, Lebon s dennition includes actual groups, as well as mobs and other potential 
groups. Reter to LeBon, J. U697). The crowd. London: T. Fisher Unwin; LeBon, G. (1987). 
In R. H. Turner & L. M. Killian. Collective behavior (3rd edJ. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc.; and Turner, R. H., & Killian, L. M. (1987). Collective behavior (3rd ed.). 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
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eoucanonai power-rne cdpacuv to control ithe distnoution or; cultural knowieage 
ano inrormation v-vintin society. 
episodic—power-a torm or social power associated with situationai factors. 
cnanges occurring within tne social environment. 
tederai power-the relatively equal distribution or social power among diverse 
power structures at differential organisational levels. 
rederal power structure-the governing body or a federation consisting of diverse 
power structures including a central organizational power structure and 
relatively autonomous divisional power structures—with differential 
responsioility for policy ano decision making, 
teoeraiism-a social relationship in which social power is shared among diverse 
power structures at differential organizational levels. 
reoeration-an organization consisting of diverse social groups that are united for 
speciric purposes, but independent tor other purposes. 
horizontal ^organizational; power structure-tne total system of organizational 
control consisting of organizational leaders trom organizational components or 
divisions ^organs;.'3 
mdiviaual power-a torm or social power exercised by a single social actor. 
inrormal group-an actual group that is relatively unstructured and generally not 
controlled bv a formal power structure. 
involutary association-an association consisting of individuals with common 
ascribed characteristics (eg, ethnicity; race; nationality; common ancestry; 
common heritage, etc.;. 
•'Rerer to Hall, R. H. U972). Organizations: Structure and process. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc.; Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. 11966). The social psychology of organizations. 
New 'fork: Wiley.; and Katz, D.. & Kahn, R. L. (1978). The social psychology or 
nraanizations. New York: Wiley. 
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leqal instuunon-a componem or the political institution that is established, 
rarmallv aocumentea ana manirest througn a society's constitution. 
leqal power-a rorm or political power legitimated within a society's constitution, 
a legal document that legitimates the form or government, the distribution or 
political power. as well as the rundamental liberties or diverse social actors.1* 
medical institunon-a social institution that legitimates medical power and 
controls access to medical resources. 
medical power-the capacity to control health-related issues and access to medical 
resources within society. 
military institution-a mechanism or social control empiovea within society. 
military power-the capacity to employ coercive measures for: 1. social control; 
or i. to attain some desired goal. 
mop-an aggregate or individuals characterized bv episodic power and stimulated 
towards social action by situational (changes occurring within the social 
environments and/or affective factors.^ 
mop power-a form or episodic power and social action performed by mobs, 
aggregates or individuals stimulated towards action bv situational and/or 
artective ractors. 
municipality -a relatively autonomous, self-governing and incorporated 
community. 
municipal power structure-the governing body of a municipality, 
organization-an actual group that is formally structured and characterized by 
^Rerer to Ferguson. J. H.. & McHenry, u. E. (1967). The Mmerican system of government 
i9th edj. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.; Lineberry, R. L. (1980;. Government in 
America: People, politics, and policy. Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company.; 
Prewitt. K.. & Verba, 5. (1977). An introouction to American government (2nd ed.). New 
j'ork: Harper & Row, Publishers: and Prewitt, K., & Verba, S. (1980). Principles of 
American government (3rd edj. New York: Harper & Row. Publishers. 
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division into diverse smaller components, social units rererreo to as organs, 
organizational power-a form or collective cower exercised bv members or an 
organization. 
perpetual power-a rorm or social power characterized dv regular patterns and 
stability within tne social environment, thus mav be exercised on a regular 
and continuous basis. 
personal power-power that originates within the self and is characterized by a 
relatively low level of restraint (inhibition;.^ 
political institution-the primary social institution that legitimates, is associated 
with, and erfects social action and social power. 
political power-a primary form of social power employed to attain, maintain, 
secure, preserve, protect and enhance diverse social interests. 
potential group-a social unit consisting of "potential" social relationships, 
although members are characterized by "low" rates of: 1. social 
identification; and 2. social "interaction." 
potential power-an implicit capacity to "influence" and affect social behavior, as 
well as social policy ana decision making. 
religion-a structure or social identification within society. 
religious institution-a social institution that: 1. legitimates the social power of 
the power elite in some societies; and 2. legitimates the religious power of 
the "religious elite," influential religious actors. 
religious power-1. the capacity to legitimate a society's social ideology, norms 
and patterns of social behavior (eg, rituals), and the distribution of social 
resources; or 2. the capacity to influence policy and decision making within a 
5Basea--in part—on McClelland, D. C. (1975). Power: The inner experience. New York: 
Irvington Publishers, inc. 
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social unit leg, religious groups, society ana the community), 
social group-a social unit consisting or ootential social relationships, 
social institution-leginmatss the distnoution of social power within society, 
social power-power generating from the social environment—including diverse 
factors or variables associated with social interaction—which is 
characterized by a relatively high level of restraint (inhibition;.^ 
social religion-a structure of social identification with a society's predominant 
social i.eg, secular; ideology. 
social unit-any level or social functioning, including individuals and social 
groups. 
special interest group-an actual group characterized by specific social interests, 
specinc social motives and specific social goals/ 
state-the social structure through which social institutions and social 
units—including individuals and social groups—interact. 
theistic rehgion-a structure of social identification with a social group through 
theoligical ideologies, ideologies associated with the supernatural 
phenomena, including spiritual concepts (eg, a deity) and events inexplicable 
by rational means, thus empirically immeasurable. 
vertical ^organizational) power structure-the governing body and general control 
center of the organization-at-large. 
voluntary association-an association consisting of individuals that socially 
interact on the basis of common social characteristics leg, social interests, 
social goals, etcj. 
0Rerer to Zeigler, L. H., Jennings, M. K., & Peak. G. W. (1974). Governing American schools: 
Pnlitical interaction in local school districts. North Scituate: Duxburv Press. 
